


ACHIEVING UNITY OF EFFORT AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL  
THROUGH THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS



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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

## ABSTRACT

### ACHIEVING UNITY OF EFFORT AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL THROUGH THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS, by MAJ CHRISTOPHER R. JONES, 105 pages.

Since the end of the Cold War, the US has employed its armed forces into a host of contingency operations in countries, such as Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia. More recently, the US has undertaken operations in Afghanistan and Iraq as part of the larger Global War on Terrorism. Throughout each operation, the military was not the lone instrument of national power employed into the region. As such, these operations have proved particularly complex as the US military has experienced difficulty achieving unity of effort with the other involved US governmental agencies through the operational level interagency process. This thesis tests the proposition of whether problems achieving unity of effort are due to the organizational structure of agencies functioning at the operational level, the operational framework wherein coordination takes place, or organizational culture. To help answer this question, this thesis will review the interaction of military and nonmilitary organizations at the operational level during three operations: Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti (1994-1997), the Global War on Terrorism's Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan (2001 - present), and Operation Iraqi Freedom (2002 - present). Using Graham Allison's three conceptual models for analyzing governmental decision making, study into the interaction of organizations through the interagency process will provide insight into where obstacles to unity of effort originate and potential ways they can be overcome.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This was a personal goal. I set out on this little journey with no great expectation that I would enlighten anyone but myself and with confidence that my thesis would not significantly alter the universal body of knowledge. It was a challenge pursued in the interest of learning how to research, improving my skills to think critically and write clearly, and broaden my understanding of how our military interacts with other US government agencies through a nebulous concept known as the interagency process. I think that this has been accomplished.

I owe a debt of gratitude to my thesis committee that gave their time and encouragement to this project. LTC(R) Ted Shadid, LTC(R) Bob Walz, and MAJ Mary Bradley freely gave advice and guidance throughout the course of researching and writing this thesis. On the cover page should be a stamp noting “help received.” Their passion for discussing the interagency process was inspiring and yet mystifying.

I would also like to recognize the contributions of Graham Allison and Kate L. Turabian in making this process most memorable.

Without exception, the greatest credit for this thesis goes to my family. I thank my wife – Kristin—and children—Abigail, Emily, and Peden—for the love, laughter, patience, and support they have shown me throughout this project and the course of my military career. I thank them for their tolerance of papers and books strewn across the house, times when Daddy could not play catch, and for encouraging me to keep writing when that was the last thing I wanted to do. I love you all.

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## ACRONYMS

CENTCOM	US Central Command
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CMOC	Civil Military Operations Center
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
DoD	Department of Defense
DoS	Department of State
FOI	Future of Iraq
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
JFCOM	US Joint Forces Command
JIACG	Joint Interagency Coordination Group
NSC	National Security Council
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
ORHA	Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
OUD	Operation Uphold Democracy
PDD	Presidential Decision Directive
Pol-Mil	Political-Military
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Teams
S/CRS	State/Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	US Government

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

Whether nation building, providing assistance to budding democracies, combating transnational crime, countering asymmetrical threats to world order, or supporting humanitarian assistance or peace operations, nearly every significant security undertaking demands interagency teamwork. But no US national government civilian organization currently is structured internally or empowered regionally to coordinate interagency activities within US Combatant Commands in peacetime or in a crisis.<sup>1</sup>

Thomas Gibbings, Donald Hurley, and Scott Moore

Since the end of the Cold War, the US military has entered into contingency operations in countries such as Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Haiti. More recently, the US has undertaken operations in Afghanistan and Iraq as part of the larger Global War on Terror (GWOT). Throughout each operation, the military was not the lone instrument of national power employed into the region. As such, these operations have proved to be particularly complex as the US military has experienced difficulty achieving unity of effort at the operational level with other involved US governmental agencies.

These interagency organizations representing the diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of national power are present in every operation.<sup>2</sup> Like the military, they employ their respective ends, ways, and means to resolving the regional crisis. Their inclusion into the operation brings unique capabilities and often-differing vision toward resolving the conflict. However, integrating the efforts of the military and nonmilitary organizations in the interagency process to achieve unity of effort has proved elusive. The failure to integrate allows for unclear lines of authority and communication in the region, leading to confusion during the execution of the operation.

There are many possible explanations on why integrating military and nonmilitary organizations in the interagency process is difficult. Some possible explanations consider the lack of a formal coordination process, insufficient number of field personnel within various agencies, and the belief that organizational bias precludes fostering good working relations. While there have been calls from the military and their civilian counterparts for better coordination at the operational level, the remedy for the problem is not readily forthcoming. By not strengthening the ability to integrate operational level military and nonmilitary actions in the interagency process, the instruments of power applied to the crisis will lose some of their potential combined effectiveness.

The research question for this thesis is, How are problems achieving unity of effort between military and nonmilitary organizations through the interagency process at the operational level impacted by organizational structure, operational framework, and organizational culture?

The topic of military and nonmilitary coordination within the interagency process is not new but growing in discussion due to the increasing US involvement in the post-Cold War world. In conversation, organizations frequently vilify the interagency process and describe it as too ad hoc and uncontrollable, creating more confusion between participants than contributing clarity to the operation at hand. To many observers, its form and functions are overly complex. The interagency process is only a forum for coordinating between diverse organizations representing the national instruments of power. The process does not include a set number of participants or subscribe to a formalized manner in which various organizations interact. However, its presence is

necessary and unavoidable for the US government (USG) and its individual entities to function.

The interagency process does not limit its role to Washington and the strategic level of war. As each organization sends its representatives to a particular region as part of a contingency operation, the need for coordination continues. Like the military, the interagency process will therefore have an active and continuing role in the crisis region at the operational level. During the time leading up to a contingency operation, other instruments of national power, participants in the interagency process, such as DoS and possibly USAID, will already be working to resolve the crisis before the military's employment into the region. This will necessitate the military's understanding of what nonmilitary actions are ongoing in the region before and during the execution of military operations. In this light, an effective strategy to resolving a regional crisis will depend on integrating all elements of power through the interagency process at the operational level to achieve unity of effort with clear lines of authority and lines of communication.

The difficulty integrating military and nonmilitary actions at the operational level is a reoccurring lesson. In each of the contingency operations undertaken over the past decade, this lack of integration has produced enough obstacles to meeting the political-military objective that the military and other interagency participants have made a series of internal reforms. These reformations differ by organization and in their emphasis on strategic versus operational level focus. This indicates that involved organizations view even the problem of integrating military and nonmilitary organizations at the operational level differently.

In the military Joint Publication 1, *Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces* addresses the subject of military participation in the interagency process. This publication cites interagency coordination as an integral part of the team concept of warfare. This theme continues in Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, which states:

Combatant commanders and subordinate joint force commanders (JFCs) are likely to operate with agencies representing other US instruments of national power; with foreign governments; and with nongovernmental and international agencies in a variety of circumstances. The intrinsic nature of interagency coordination demands that commanders and joint planners consider all instruments of national power and recognize which agencies are best qualified to employ these elements toward the objective. Unity of effort is made more difficult by the agencies' different and sometimes conflicting policies, procedures, and decision making techniques.<sup>3</sup>

Subsequent publications like Joint Publication 3-08, *Interagency Coordination during Joint Operations*, provide greater emphasis on integration at the operational level. Although recognizing the necessity of integrating military and nonmilitary organizations in the interagency process, these publications only address the problem from the military perspective. Further, the publications do not adequately address the mechanics of integrating within the interagency process, only the requirement to do so.

Today, joint doctrine highlights the need for creating operational level Civil-Military Operation Centers (CMOC) for integrating nonmilitary organizations into military operations. Through refining the structure of the CMOC and providing additional training to military staffs for interacting with civilian agencies, the military is taking a proactive approach to achieving unity of effort in the field. The success of the CMOC still rests in part on the desire of the civilian agencies to participate. Without a requirement to do so, the interagency representatives are not bound to coordinate their activities with the CMOC.

The military's most significant step toward harmonizing the efforts of military and nonmilitary organizations is the creation of the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG). The Joint Staff submitted the proposal for this organization to the National Security Council (NSC) deputies committee that approved it and instructed the combatant commands to implement the concept in January 2002.<sup>4</sup> As conceptualized, JIACGs are “organized to provide interagency advice and expertise to combatant commanders and their staffs, coordinate interagency counter-terrorism plans and objectives, and integrate military, interagency, and host nation efforts.”<sup>5</sup> Although focused primarily in support of the GWOT, this structure has the capability to facilitate coordination and integration of organizations in the interagency process across the spectrum of military operations.

Recognizing the problem of interagency coordination, specifically after Operation Restore Hope in Somalia 1993, the Clinton administration took the first step to mandate reform by promulgating the *Generic Political-Military Plan for a Complex Contingency Operation* (pol-mil). This document serves as a requirements guide to capturing agency specific information and actions into one coherent, operation specific, interagency wide plan. Its use in Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti 1994 drew praise from the administration when compared to the numerous problems encountered in Somalia brought on by poor coordination amongst involved agencies. This tool, although thorough in addressing interagency requirements, focuses on the strategic level and does not adequately address coordination requirements at the operational level. The result was initial confusion on the ground where the military expected civilian agencies to be ready to function and the civilian agencies were still back in the US realizing that their military counterparts had deployed without leaving a point of contact for further coordination.<sup>6</sup>

Building upon the experience of Uphold Democracy, the Clinton administration issued Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD 56) in 1997. This document lays out the broad requirements for institutionalizing interagency coordination and planning only at the strategic level. Due to absence of a new crisis from time of inception to changing of administrations, the full implementation of PDD 56 did not occur and its effectiveness is unknown.

Upon entering office, the Bush administration did not re-issue PDD 56. It is however staffing a similar directive along the lines of PDD 56 titled National Security Policy Directive (NSPD) “XX.” Although the specifics of the new directive are unknown, this new directive may institutionalize some aspects of interagency coordination at the operational level. Contents of the NSPD reportedly call for establishing a NSC-chaired Contingency Planning Policy Coordination Committee with interagency responsibilities and resource issues amongst its focus.<sup>7</sup> Since NSPD “XX” is still awaiting approval and implementation, the coordination and integration expected to occur at the operational level will continue in absentia of a formalized policy guiding the interagency process.

Without a coordinating system forced on all USG agencies functioning at the operational level, the risk of disjointed efforts will be present in each operation. How organizational structure, operational framework and organizational culture impacts integration of military and nonmilitary organizations to achieve unity of effort at the operational level is the focus of this thesis. The result may produce a better understanding of not only the problem, but also where to find potential solutions for better integration leading to the elusive unity of effort.

## Definitions

Interagency coordination: Joint Publication (JP) 3-08, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations* defines interagency coordination in the following way, “Within context of the Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of the Department of Defense and engaged US Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, private voluntary organizations, and regional and international organizations for the purpose of accomplishing an objective.”<sup>8</sup>

Operational level of war: JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, defines operational level of war as “The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas. Activities at this area link tactics to strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objective, initiating actions and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative support of forces, and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives.”<sup>9</sup>

Lines of authority: Interagency derived agreements that reflect a clear, predetermined area of responsibility in which an assigned agency has oversight and establishes where that oversight begins and ends.

Lines of communication: Linked to lines of authority, refers to predetermined channels through which an agency or organization communicates with other agencies or organizations up, down and laterally across the strategic and operational levels.

### Assumptions

The assumptions made in this paper concern the relevance of organizational culture in the operation, the necessity of military-interagency integration, and that actions occurring at the operational level are crucial to achieving unity of effort during the operation.

The first assumption is that a theoretical approach to analyzing organizational culture and process has relevance to understanding how culture and process can influence military-interagency integration.

The second assumption is that the contemporary operational environment will necessitate that the military work closely with the other interagency representatives in the region to meet military-political objectives.

The third assumption is that agencies functioning at the operational level are in a better position to understand the situation on the ground than those planning and coordinating operations in Washington.

### Limitations

This thesis maintains focus on integrating USG entities at the operational level. The author will not be privy to the discussions, agreements, and arrangements made at the strategic level that influence the mechanics of how agencies interact at the operational level. The same limitation appears at the operational level where related decisions and evolving policies that emerge from the Combatant Commander's staff are available only to those agencies directly involved in the region. Further, unpublished directives such as NSPD "XX" and similar documents are not open for inclusion in this paper. As such, background information must come from open sources found in books and periodicals.

Based on assumptions and definitions, this paper's delimitation is time period, effect of individual personalities within agencies on the interagency process, media impact on operations, and the influence of nongovernmental and private volunteer agencies present in the region. This thesis will focus on operations completed in Haiti and those ongoing in Afghanistan and Iraq. Limiting the scope of the paper to these engagements will not detract from understanding the nature of the problem. Similarly, the changing of personnel heading the different agencies will not unilaterally affect how organizations view each other in the conduct of operations. The significance of the media's impact on operations, like the influences of nongovernmental and private volunteer organizations, is too broad for inclusion into this paper. By limiting the focus of the thesis to what occurs only between USG entities operating in a crisis region simplify the nature of the problem to where analysis and recommendations are made possible.

#### Significance of the Study

While executing current and future operations, the military will continue to work with other USG agencies at the operational level. The degree of integration between the military and nonmilitary organizations will have a significant impact on success of the operation in terms of achieving unity of effort amongst the various agencies. Currently, the coordination and planning that occurs at the operational level fails to integrate the national elements of power in a manner that facilitates the accomplishment of strategic goals. Without reforming the interagency process, ad hoc coordination and disjointed effort will continue to characterize how agencies operate in current and future operations. Understanding the nature of the problem, its causes and possible remedies, will enable

the military and nonmilitary organizations in the interagency process to operate more efficiently in the crisis region.

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<sup>1</sup>Thomas Gibbings, Donald Hurley, and Scott Moore, “Interagency Operations Centers: An Opportunity We Can’t Ignore,” *Parameters* 28, (winter 1998): 100.

<sup>2</sup>Some of the other US government interagency representatives operating in the region may include the Department of State’s (DoS) ambassadors and country teams, the US Agency for International Development (USAID), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and Department of Treasury (DoT).

<sup>3</sup>Department of Defense, Joint Publication (JP) 3-02, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, Washington, DC: US Government, 1996, viii.

<sup>4</sup>Charles N. Cardinal, Timber P. Pangonas, and Edward Marks, “The Global War on Terrorism: A Regional Approach to Coordination,” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, no. 32 (autumn 2002): 50.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.

<sup>6</sup>Margret D. Hayes and Gary F. Wheatley, *Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations: Haiti – A Case Study* (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1996) 30.

<sup>7</sup>Michele Flournoy, “Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Interagency Strategy and Planning for Post-Conflict Reconstruction (White Paper),” *Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)*, March 2002, 2.

<sup>8</sup>JP 3-02, viii.

<sup>9</sup>Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Washington, DC: US Government, 2001, 550.

## CHAPTER 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY

The topic under examination has received increased recognition only through operations spanning the past decade. As such, there are not a large body of literature that focus specifically on how agencies plan and coordinate to achieve unity of effort through the interagency process, especially so at the operational level. The purpose of this chapter is to highlight available sources that address the interagency process directly or indirectly. Given the scarceness of literature that addresses the primary question directly, the research for this thesis is the composition of traditional readings (books, periodicals, professional journals) and web research (lessons learned, speech transcripts). The compilation of various resources drawn upon for this thesis fit into five categories: joint publications, professional publications, books, governmental decision making, and commentary (newspaper articles, editorial opinions). This review will follow these categories minus the later category, commentary, that contains sources too numerous and diverse to be effectively discussed in this chapter. Likewise, resources whose contribution to this thesis is limited to providing only back drop information or confirmation of events found in other sources is also omitted.

The resources that are available for study predominately address the dynamics of the interagency process from the strategic level and address the operational level only on the periphery of the discussion. Most of the available literature on the operational level is found in organizations such as the National Defense University (NDU), Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), RAND,<sup>1</sup> and the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), and various articles found in periodicals such as *Joint Forces Quarterly*

and *Parameters*. An important aspect of this review is the timeliness of the information. Much of the available literature that addresses the interagency process at the operational level does so prior to the start of GWOT. As such, it does not provide commentary concerning recent attempts by the military to strengthen interagency coordination to include the creation of Joint Interagency Coordination Groups.

#### Joint Publications

The Department of Defense's Joint Publications series offers the most information on techniques for integrating civil-military actions to achieve unity of effort at the operational level. This provides a starting point for research but is clearly representative of only one agency's viewpoint. The contents of Joint Publication (JP) 3-08, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations* Volume I, outlines the interagency process, identifies participants, describes the importance of interagency coordination, and discusses methods for organizing for interagency operations.<sup>2</sup> Two themes emerge from the publication. First, from the military's standpoint, the geographic combatant commands are the focal point for integrating civilian agencies into regional military strategies. Second, achieving unity of effort between the military and civilian agencies is made difficult by the impact of agency cultures, convoluted command arrangements between the agencies, and often differing objectives. Although the publication, like other military joint publications and service specific field manuals, stresses the need for interagency coordination, it does not go in depth into methods for coordinating with civilian agencies. Volume II of JP 3-08 does not further address interagency coordination but does provide quick reference for understanding civilian agency capabilities, resources, and means of contact.

Whereas the military has produced manuals that address the subject of interagency coordination, a similar query in such organizations as DoS does not produce a similar product. This leaves articles from various periodicals as the source from which to infer how civilian agencies interact with their military counterparts. The absence of a coordinating handbook for the civilian agencies is an indicator that the value placed on operational level coordination is not equal between the military and the civilian agencies.

Determining how agencies organize their structures for functioning at the operational level is an equally daunting task. The military outlines in its publications the responsibilities of coordination cells but not their physical composition. Again using DoS as an example, their official website explains the role of Political Advisors (POLADs) but does go into specifics of staffing POLADs onto combatant commander staffs. Similarly, the DoS website does not provide the composition of country teams already functioning in the various regions. Other agencies like USAID are more open with information that is readily accessible on their official website.<sup>3</sup>

### Professional Publications

In the realm of professional publications, the topic of interagency coordination at the operational level receives greater attention. Of note are several case studies and articles originating from NDU, RAND, and *Joint Forces Quarterly*. These sources provide useful insight into the nature of the interagency process, identify friction points between civilian and military agencies, and propose a variety of measures to make the interagency process more functional. The usefulness of these sources to this thesis differs given the time each document was produced. In combination, however, these sources

frame the issue of interagency coordination and offer several explanations into how the interagency process flourishes and falters.

William W. Mendel and David G. Bradford authored a NDU case study titled *Interagency Cooperation: A Regional Model for Overseas Operations*. This study draws upon the experience of US Southern Command in the 1990s to suggest ways that civilian and military leadership can resolve issues of interagency coordination. The study highlights areas where interagency coordination falters; stresses that the regional commanders are the only USG entities empowered regionally to pull together interagency participants; and proposes a series of exercises that serve as a method for improving interagency coordination. After analysis and discussion of interagency coordination, the study acknowledges that the problem of “who is in charge?” still thwarts effective integration. It concludes by submitting the suggestion that training integration of agencies through the interagency process is the best way to bridge bureaucratic fault lines.

Another NDU product is the *Interagency Management of Complex Crisis Operations Handbook* dated January 2003. This document exclusively addresses the interagency process at the strategic level. Its intended purpose is to institutionalize how agencies plan and manage complex contingency operations. Of use is its discussion of how determining who is in charge of an operation, as the designated “lead agency,” is critical to achieving unity of effort through the interagency process. Unfortunately, the document does not address the operational level other than to state that the interagency community at the strategic level must ensure coordination is carried through to the operational level.

Another NDU product contributing to this thesis is the Hayes and Wheatley work titled *Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations: Haiti – A Case Study*.<sup>4</sup> This study drew upon the experiences of operators, planners, and analysts involved in Operation Uphold Democracy to identify command and control issues stemming from the interagency process. Although the study does not go into great depth when analyzing particular facets of the operations, it does cover a wide range of interagency related problems. Amongst other findings, the study's conclusions point out the need for doctrine to guide the interagency process; the requirement to recognize operational differences between civilian and military organizations; and the importance of interagency command and control arrangements in the conduct of an operation.

Along the same lines of the Hayes and Wheatley study is Jennifer Morrison Taw's RAND study titled *Interagency Coordination in Operations Other Than War: Implications for the US Army*.<sup>5</sup> This work also uses Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti as the backdrop for studying the interagency process. Although offering more in depth analysis into the particular outputs of the process than the Hayes and Wheatley work, the conclusions drawn from the study are quite similar. Of note, Taw finds that many of the interagency process problems that frustrate the military are beyond its ability to control. To counter interagency shortcomings, Taw primarily suggests a two pronged approach. First, change the cultural outlook of the military with regard to the interagency process through training exercises that educate military and civilian agencies about each other's capabilities. Second, ensure lines of authority are clearly established between agencies prior to commencing the operation.

The theme of delineating lines of authority and increasing organizational knowledge of other agencies' capabilities appears in most of the articles reviewed for this thesis. In addition to these themes, the pertinent articles appearing in *Joint Force Quarterly* tend to emphasize the role of organizational culture and the imbalance of representation amongst agencies at the operational level as contributing factors leading to a dysfunctional interagency process.<sup>6</sup> Other common observations include the lack of an institutionalized doctrine for guiding how agencies interact through the interagency process, and the differing approach civilian and military agencies take toward planning for an operation. Taken together, these articles highlight the many factors that hinder achieving unity of effort at the operational level.

### Books

There are numerous books on Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti and more so regarding the ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Textbooks tend to offer operational level information as background to what is occurring on the ground or, conversely, to demonstrate how lack of planning in Washington influences operations in the region. The same is true for nonfiction books written about these operations. The available works either center on the strategic level or the tactical level but rarely at the operational level.<sup>7</sup> In this light, the research information gathered through books is limited to providing background information to a specific operation or providing the reader with insight into problems which inference could be made that the problem originated through poor coordination at the operational level.

Two notable works on Haiti provided the information for the first case study. John R. Ballard's book *Upholding Democracy* documents the operation from inception to UN

turnover. This work is particularly beneficial toward understanding the impact of security restrictions on the planning process, the degree of compartmentalized planning that occurred within agencies, and the insufficient level of coordination that took place between agencies. These points also appear in a book coauthored by Walter Kretchik, Robert Baumann and John Fishel titled *Invasion, Intervention, “Intervasion”: A Concise History of the US Army in Operation Uphold Democracy*.<sup>8</sup> This work provides a similar depth of analysis into the Haiti operation, from planning through completion, and augments Ballard’s book by providing the reader with greater details into the various facets of the operation. Although Ballard’s discussion of pre-war planning is also full of detail, both books address the interagency process in the context of explaining only a part of the operation.

The number of books available for studying operations in Afghanistan and Iraq increase daily. Two books which indirectly provide insight into the interagency process are Bob Woodward’s *Bush at War* and *Plan of Attack*.<sup>9</sup> Although the level of discussion centers on what occurs at the strategic level, the reader can infer how the multitude and complexity of issues debated at the strategic level can influence the degrees of information and support which flows from Washington to agencies in the field.

Two books that indirectly address the interagency process at the operational level are General Tommy Frank’s *American Soldier*<sup>10</sup> and Lieutenant General Michael DeLong’s *Inside CENTCOM*. Each offer either background information into problems arising from the interagency process or briefly discuss the sometimes counterproductive interaction between agencies in the course of an operation. Both books carry as an unintentional theme that the unified commands are vital toward coordinating and

implementing US regional strategy. In discussing the importance of the unified commands, the underlying point is that the combatant commander retains significant clout in his assigned region. This notion is central to Dana Priest's book *The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America's Military* which details numerous examples of how the unified commands have unparalleled influence in their region.<sup>11</sup>

### Governmental Decision Making

Finding views into how organizations function with respect to beliefs and culture is not difficult. Many books discuss organizations from a structural efficiency standpoint and others that discuss organizational culture from a psychological approach. Although many books focusing on the composition and efficiency of organizations originate from the business world, quite useful ones for this thesis focus solely on government agencies. Two notable books provide significant insight into understanding why organizations behave as they do. These books are *Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It*, by James Q. Wilson and *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* by Graham Allison.<sup>12</sup>

In his book, Wilson looks at agencies such as the US Army, CIA, and Foreign Service and provides analysis of these by looking at organizations, operators, managers, executives and the environment in which they operate. Of particular value to this thesis is the chapter 2 content that centers on the interrelation of organizational beliefs, interests, and culture. In discussing the impact of organizational culture, Wilson brings forth three points that are applicable to the topic of how military and nonmilitary agencies interact through the interagency process. In summary, organizations will not provide vigor to tasks not seen as part of its culture; organizations will seek to dominate other

organizations; and organizations will resist taking on additional tasks not seen as compatible with its dominant culture.<sup>13</sup> Thus, an organization's interests, culture, and structure which support achieving its goals combine to dictate how it will interact with other organizations.

Graham Allison's book, *Essence of Decision*, is widely regarded as the authoritative work for studying the complexity of governmental decision making. Set against the backdrop of the Cuban missile crisis as a case study, Allison develops three theoretical models for examining governmental organizations. He named these models the Rational Actor (Model I), Organization Behavior (Model II), and Governmental Politics (Model III). Each model offers a different prism through which to view organizational decisions. Combining these three separate views into a particular situation gives insight into the factors that influence organizational decision-making processes; explains the dynamics of the decision processes in light of the organization's interaction with other agencies; and the non-tangible effect of organizational culture on its decisions. These models have significant utility when applied together for attempting to understand why organizations make decisions and behave in a particular manner.<sup>14</sup>

### Summary of Literature

There is not a large body of available literature covering the interagency process at the operational level. Information to support study of the interagency process must come through a variety of resources that addresses the topic in various forums with varying degrees of discussion. A sufficient number of resources exist to understand the impact of this process upon the execution of contingency operations. Even without an appreciable quantity of literature that defines and critiques the interagency process at the

operational level, enough sources exist to support this study. The resources that support the selected case studies are sufficient in quantity and depth of discussion. As for analytical tools to study the interaction and decision-making processes within organizations, the Graham Allison models more than suffice.

### Methodology

The organizational structure of this thesis follows the approved structure disseminated by Director of Graduate Degree Programs, US Army Command and General Staff College.<sup>15</sup> This thesis relies on qualitative analysis. It studies a problem that requires collection of information from a variety of sources that does not support using an empirical approach to collection and analysis. Sources utilized in the research include a variety of books, articles, and other media that require interpretation for contribution toward answering the primary question. Detailed argument into specifics of an organization or facet of an operation is avoided in order to capture the larger issue posed in the thesis question.

This examination adheres to the scientific methods of research. The methodical process for the paper include defining the problem and formulating research questions; reviewing literature in the field of study and validating the research question; selecting a research approach; collecting evidence; analyzing and interpreting evidence; drawing conclusions and making recommendations.<sup>16</sup> Following this process, chapter 1 encompasses an introduction and states the nature of the problem in the form of the primary thesis question. Chapter 1 also informs the reader to the scope of the thesis by defining guiding assumptions and disclosing limitations to the research. Chapter 2 gives a brief summary of the breadth of information concerning the topic that is available for

study and outlines the methodology applied to executing research and subsequent analysis. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 comprise the body of the thesis. These chapters sift through the available information to answer the primary research question.

Throughout the chapter 4, the evidence within the case studies that points to breaks in lines of communication and lines of authority stemming from the interagency process will be analyzed using Allison's models, discussed earlier in the literature review, to determine why these breaks occurred. These models will focus on areas which suggest these breaks may have originated from organizational structure, operational framework, or organizational culture. The identification and analysis of problems using Allison's models will determine which are truly intrinsic of the interagency process. The degree which identification and isolation of these problems is possible will support the validity of potential solutions.

### Allison's Models

#### Model I (Rational Actor)

Model I is the oldest and most often used method for analyzing decision-making. This model views an organization as an “actor” that will rationally choose a particular course of action based on the perception that it will maximize the attainment of its goals and objectives. The choice is made in response to problem that carries a threat to the organization’s goals and objectives if no action is taken. The rational action, or deliberate choice of a particular course of action over another, comes after weighing alternative choices, evaluating the consequences of the choices, and ensuring that the chosen action is the best of all available options. Employing Model I analysis is similar to playing the role of “Monday morning quarterback” where the question becomes, “If I have the same

information, interests, and options, would I make that choice?” This model assumes the “actor” will always act rationally.

### Model II (Organizational Behavior)

Model II views the same set of rational choices seen through the previous model as being products of organizational outputs, or actions, which derive from the decision-making processes present inside each organization. Thus, the rational decisions are made “less as deliberate choices and more as outputs of large organizations functioning according to standard patterns of behavior.”<sup>17</sup> This model identifies several factors that influence decision-making processes within organizations. These factors include attention to parochial priorities, reliance on solving problems by enacting fixed routines, limited flexibility for addressing problem solving in a manner different from the established routines, and desire to avoid uncertainty. The model suggests that understanding the internal factors that influence the decision-making process within an organization and the organization’s pattern of behavior will explain why it acted or will act in a particular manner.

As Allison notes, understanding the organization requires understanding all of the factors that weigh in on the decision-making process. Each organization exists to provide a specific set of capabilities which define its mission. Along with this mission is a set of interests and goals which it seeks to protect from outside influence (i.e. other agencies). To function more efficiently, the organization institutionalizes procedures, or programs, for accomplishing all facets of the organization’s duties and responsibilities. The compilation of these programs forms repertoires, or “tools”, that can be employed against a particular problem. Any problem is then addressed through routine application of

programs if the problem can be solved through the employment of the organizational repertoire and is deemed administratively feasible where the benefit of action outweighs the choice of doing nothing. Organizational flexibility for problem solving is then limited by reliance on established programs that are created for a particular set of problems.

For increased efficiency, organizations fractionate power while maintaining the optimum level of centralized control over how the organization acts in response to a problem. An organization is also comprised of numerous personalities that reflect the organizational culture. This culture shapes how an organization will view a problem by first taking into account its own perceptions and parochial priorities. To protect its own priorities, organizations will coordinate with others to reduce uncertainty into how other organizations acting in response to the same problem will impact these priorities. Thus, the level of attention an organization will invest into a problem depends on where it falls in relation to the organization's sequential attention to goals.

### Model III (Bureaucratic Politics)

Allison's third model considers organizational behavior and the outcomes that emerge as a matter of maneuvers made by principal players in a "zero sum" game. In this game, there are winners and losers in the pursuit of influential decision-making power with the next higher decision-maker and over other organizations in the conduct of an operation. These principal players, leading their respective organizations, maneuver through a process stressing bargaining and consensus with other players as a means to secure or protect their organization's goals, interests, stakes, positions and power in the decision-making process. This model acknowledges that the leaders of these organizations can not act autonomously. To be successful in terms of pursuing their

organization's interests, they must rely on a process of give and take with other organizations that defines bureaucratic bargaining.

Another aspect to this model that separates it from Model II is the matter of a principal player's perception of a problem being formed by the subordinates in his organization. At each level of an organization, representatives interact with their counterparts from other organizations. Through these interactions, problems are identified which are pushed up the organizational chain of command for final consideration and decision by the principal. Accompanying the problem description rendered by the subordinates to the principal is recommended solutions which take into account the organization's interests and motivations. In this light, the principal's personality, position in the game, degree of power enjoyed in the decision-making process, and bargaining skills are determining factors in whether the resulting governmental action is favorable to his respective organization.

The primary question asks how are problems integrating military and nonmilitary organizations in the interagency process at the operational level impacted by organizational structure, operational framework, and organizational culture? In defining the problem, secondary questions emerge which also must find an answer to support the post analysis recommendations. The secondary questions are:

1. What formalized procedures exist for planning and coordinating between military and nonmilitary agencies within the interagency process?
2. How do the military and nonmilitary agencies differ in their approach to planning and coordinating at the operational level?

3. What are the shortfalls in the military-interagency relationship at the operational level that cause a break in lines of communication and lines of authority?
4. Should the interagency process allow greater initiative to its representatives in the field?

The nature and sequence of the secondary questions will allow for a systematic approach for getting to the primary question. The logical order enables findings from the previous question to feed analysis of the next.

By limiting the case studies to operations in Haiti and the ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is possible to determine systemic problems in the interagency process which are relevant today. Analysis rests on information found in the literature review of open source material. Insight into the non-tangible aspect of culture will come through applying Allison's models throughout the course of the research. The intent of the thesis is to strike a balance between application of organizational theory and intense study of organization specific actions found in the case study operations. In this manner, it is possible to generate evidence supporting the impact of organizational structure, operational framework, and organizational culture on the process of integrating diverse agencies at the operational level.

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<sup>1</sup>RAND is a nonprofit institution that seeks to improve public policy through objective research and analysis to produce potential solutions that address challenges facing public organizations.

<sup>2</sup>US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, JP 3-08, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations* vol. 1, Washington, DC: US Government, 1996.

<sup>3</sup>Department of State; available from <http://www.state.gov>; Internet; Accessed on 28 January 2005; and US Agency for International Development, available from <http://www.usaid.gov>; Internet; accessed on 28 January 2005..

<sup>4</sup>Margret D. Hayes and Gary F. Wheatley, *Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations: Haiti – A Case Study* (Washington, DC: NDU), 1996.

<sup>5</sup>Jennifer Morrison Taw. *Interagency Cooperation in Operations Other Than War: Implications for the US Army* (Washington, DC: RAND), 1997.

<sup>6</sup>A few of these articles are: Patrick N. Kelleher, “Crossing Boundaries: Interagency Cooperation and the Military,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* no. 32 (autumn 2002): 104; Charles N. Cardinal, Timber P. Pangonas, and Edward Marks, “The Global War on Terrorism: A Regional Approach to Coordination,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* no. 32 (autumn 2002): 53; John Howard Eisenhour and Edward Marks, “Herding Cats: Overcoming Obstacles in Civil-Military Operations,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* no. 22 (summer 1999): 86.

<sup>7</sup>The exception is a book written by the former Deputy Commander of CENTCOM about CENTCOM’s recent experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq. Lieutenant General Michael DeLong, *Inside CENTCOM: The Unvarnished Truth About the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq* (Washington, DC: Regenerry), 2004.

<sup>8</sup>Walter E. Kretchik, Robert F. Baumann, and John T. Fishel, *Invasion, Intervention, “Intervasion”*: A Concise History of the US Army in Operation Uphold Democracy (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CGSC Press), 1998.

<sup>9</sup>Bob Woodward, *Bush at War* (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster), 2002; and Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack* (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster), 2004.

<sup>10</sup>General Tommy Franks, *American Soldier* (New York, NY: Regan), 2004.

<sup>11</sup>Dana Priest, *The Mission: Waging War and Keeping the Peace with America’s Military* (New York, NY: Norton), 2004.

<sup>12</sup>James Q. Wilson, *Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1989); and Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Understanding the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: Longman, 1999).

<sup>13</sup>Wilson, 101.

<sup>14</sup>The Allison Models are outlined later in the methodology section of this chapter.

<sup>15</sup>US Army Command and General Staff College, Student Text 20-10. *Master of Military Art and Science (MMAS) Research and Thesis*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CGSC, July 2004).

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., 14-16.

<sup>17</sup>Allison, 143.

## CHAPTER 3

### CASE STUDIES

To determine the nature and origin of problems precluding unity of effort in the interagency process it is necessary to look into several operations to identify problems thereby setting the stage for analysis into the primary research question. One vehicle for determining problems emanating from the interagency process is the historical case study. For this thesis, the historical case studies include Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti (1994 - 1997), the Global War on Terrorism's (GWOT) Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan (2001 - present), and Operation Iraqi Freedom (2002 - present).

The purpose of the case study approach is not to retell the beginning, middle, and end of the operation in detail in hopes of uncovering new evidence to answer the primary question. Instead, the purpose of using the case study approach is to identify problems in each operation then trace their connection to the interagency process at the operational level. The lessons then found in each study can undergo comparison to determine which problems are systemic and characteristic of the interagency process. There are several inherent dangers in the case study approach. First, the selective use of evidence may indicate a preconceived bias and thereby call the analysis into question. Second, the study cannot consider the total amount of information that is of possible relevance to the case study as it may not be known or available for review. Third, two of the operations considered in this paper are still in progress and as such, are less historical studies than current events but they offer enough potential lessons to be relevant. However, the similarities as well as differences between these operations, and the elapsed time between

their executions, make the cases most compelling for producing insight into the interagency process at the operational level.

The interagency players typically view the three operations under consideration as having different outcomes: one successful, one mixed, and one poor. The differences between the first and the later two operations include time, and the level of opposition to US forces. The operation in Haiti preceded the other two by a decade, was executed by a different administration, and involved no initial resistance to US forces. All three operations incorporated the four instruments of national power to meet the US strategic goals that drove the operations. These operations involved regime change from a totalitarian government to a democratic one, or restoration of one as in Haiti. Similarly, the target countries of these operations had a failed or failing infrastructure. Lastly, each produced as a byproduct more calls from those involved in the operational level of war for addressing the “interagency” problem.

#### Operation Uphold Democracy

On 16 December 1990 the Haitian people voted through an election to give a populist priest named Jean-Bertrand Aristide the Presidency of Haiti. Seven months later, on 30 September 1991, a coup d'etat led by General Raul Cedras and the Haitian military overthrew the Aristide government, forcing President Aristide to flee the country. Over the next three years, the US and the international community focused through political pressure, economic sanctions, and eventual threats of military force, to restore the elected government to power. In July 1994, after failing to restore Aristide to government through economic sanctions and political pressure, the United Nations (UN) authorized the US to assemble and lead a multinational force for that purpose. On 18 September

1994, a delegation led by former President Jimmy Carter convinced General Cedras and his allies to step down in face of an imminent US-led invasion of Haiti. At the request of Aristide and with UN sanction, US and coalition troops entered the country unopposed that same month to begin restoring the elected government. The following month President Aristide returned to power.

The mission in Haiti was a success in that it met its primary objectives of ejecting a dictator from power, returning an elected President to power, and turning the operation over to the UN six months later.<sup>1</sup> This operation entailed the military and nonmilitary agencies working together with various degrees of success. A notable product of the operation was the first political-military (pol-mil) plan written in support of a military operation. Despite generally good planning on behalf of interagency players, the pol-mil plan did not effectively integrate the agencies and the military together to achieve the desired effects. A combination of factors is responsible for this pol-mil plan falling short, manifesting problems during the conduct of the operation.

The nature of the military operation that ultimately unfolded in Haiti was peacekeeping as opposed to full-scale invasion and forced removal of a government and defeat of its army. The guide for this operation was the unexpected combination of two plans: one for opposed and one for unopposed entry. These two operational plans (OPLAN) termed 2370 and 2380, respectively, eventually developed in parallel but began at different times and with different openness to outside agencies. Although the situation in Haiti became increasingly dangerous after September 1991 with Aristide's overthrow, detailed planning in and amongst agencies did not start in earnest until the Haitian situation further deteriorated.

Military planning for Haiti began in October 1993 when the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) directed US Atlantic Command (USACOM), now US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), to focus on a forcible-entry option.<sup>2</sup> The planning, conducted by the military in the USACOM Headquarters in Norfolk, was secretive or “compartmentalized” due to the evolving situation in Haiti and a US policy that held hope for a peaceful resolution. Believing that the likelihood of intervention was increasing over time, USACOM received JCS permission to designate a Joint Task Force Headquarters to begin further detailed planning. In January 1994, General Hugh Shelton’s XVIII Airborne Corps received the message to begin compartmentalized planning for military action into Haiti.

Working in self-prescribed isolation, the military planners did not have the ability to coordinate with other agencies. Already, other branches of government to include the Departments of State, Treasury, Transportation, Commerce, Justice, Agriculture, and the CIA were engaged in working some facet of the Haiti problem.<sup>3</sup> The compartmentalization of planning prevented the interagency process from producing the two most necessary ingredients for unity of effort: coordination and consensus.

While work continued on a plan for forcible entry into Haiti, separate planning from within USACOM began to focus on the pol-mil plan that the USACOM Commander, Admiral Paul Miller, would submit to the JCS and the National Security Council (NSC) interagency working groups to synchronize both civilian and military actions in the event of intervention.<sup>4</sup> The plan, although adopted by the NSC, was essentially a product of the military as one Army officer working in the USACOM J-5 Plans cell noted,

Essentially, USACOM put together a document that told the Interagency Working Group within the National Security Council what they would be expected to contribute to an operation in Haiti. USACOM laid out the purpose of the operation, the end state, and defined criteria for military success. That document went to the JCS and then the NSC where it was codified. The document came back with corrections but essentially USACOM wrote the document.<sup>5</sup>

Thus, as the time grew closer for intervention into Haiti, the interagency working groups were privy to some aspects of the military planning. How much of this pol-mil plan permeated through the civilian agencies is unknown. However, over the months of July to September 1994, the coordination between the military and civilian agencies through the interagency process grew.

The planning process for the forcible entry option under OPLAN 2370 continued under top-secret classification. In June 1994, USACOM instructed XVIII Airborne Corps to begin planning a second option which was based on permissive entry into Haiti followed by turning the mission over to the UN six months later.<sup>6</sup> This plan, termed OPLAN 2380, placed greater emphasis on the humanitarian aspects of the operation and, with a lesser security classification, allowed greater coordination between the military and the civilian agencies. By July 1994, planning responsibility for OPLAN 2380 fell to 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division after it was designated as the JTF Headquarters should the permissive entry option be chosen. With two and half years elapsing since the overthrow of Aristide, the US military was now simultaneously developing two OPLANs for intervention into Haiti. In less than half a year, the operation would commence.

Although civilian agencies were still not privy to all the details of the OPLAN 2370 option, OPLAN 2380 allowed agencies to commence planning on some sort of a preliminary timetable with a more refined idea of what the operation would entail. As the situation in Haiti further deteriorated in late summer and military intervention seemed

imminent, USACOM began assembling interagency representatives to coordinate the plan. These meetings were less productive than what USACOM hoped for but did result in some organizations sending representatives to participate in further military planning.<sup>7</sup> Another coordination meeting was held in September at National Defense University with equally disappointing results causing one member to note, “People just recited what they were doing” and a senior military officer reportedly stating, “This is the kind of planning that gets people killed.”<sup>8</sup>

The month of September 1994 demonstrated that insufficient planning done through the interagency process affected the strategic, operational, and tactical level of war. The effects of compartmentalized planning and late desire for civil-military coordination and integration contributed to agencies looking at the impending operation differently and with different understanding as to their role and contribution. This became evident during the final walkthroughs for the operation. Although the pol-mil plan surfaced earlier in the year, and despite interagency meetings held in the summer, the “close hold” on information not only retarded mutual understanding of the operation by the different agencies, but also within the agencies themselves.

On 11 September, after forces marshaled to execute OPLAN 2370 and forces for OPLAN 2380 were alerted for deployment, USACOM went to the NSC to meet with the Haiti Interagency Working Group. The purpose of the meeting was to revisit preparations for post invasion agency specific actions in Haiti outlined in the pol-mil plan agreed to earlier in the year. During the meeting, one Army officer from USACOM in attendance noted, “many members of the working group stared in disbelief; not even their own people, who had known about the plan for over a year, had let the secret out.”<sup>9</sup> As further

evidence of insufficient coordination, during the meeting, Major General Byron, head of the USACOM J-5 Plans Cell, asked the Department of Justice representative to explain how it was going to train the new Haitian police force, an earlier agreement in the Pol-Mil plan, only for the department to say it could not handle the mission.<sup>10</sup>

The clear inference from the level of confusion found in the late interagency meetings leading up to the Haiti intervention is that the pol-mil plan lacked a combination of clarity, dissemination, and buy-in. Although operational security concerns encumbered coordination between military and civilian agencies, evidence points to a break within the agencies themselves. Agencies, while adhering to the imposed restrictions accompanying the security classification, were able to coordinate internally to clarify roles and responsibilities. The resulting confusion late in the planning cycle indicates that both internal and external agency coordination did not occur to a satisfactory level. In this light, any positive anticipatory planning for the operation by individual agencies lost effectiveness through the inadequacies of the interagency process. As the forces prepared to execute either OPLAN 2370 or 2380, another turn of events stemming from former President Carter's last minute negotiations with General Cedras and his allies, resulted in the merging of the OPLANS at the eleventh hour.

The successful and relatively smooth arrival of US forces into Haiti, considering the late changes to the OPLAN, demonstrated the flexibility of the military to adapt to changing situations. Civilian agencies did not share such a smooth transition into the operation. The late combining of OPLANS created predictable problems but also highlighted coordination failures that were outside the change to plan. USAID officials found that they could not get transportation to Haiti as the operation commenced since

their military points of contact deployed without leaving them assistance for accessing the military's transportation system.<sup>11</sup> The frustrated arrival of civilian agencies fueled the military's initial confusion as to who was in charge of civilian agency activities on the ground.

The coordination between military and civilian agencies at the tactical level did not occur until US forces were ashore. The possibility for arming the military and the agencies participating in the operation with something akin to a point of contact list for use in Haiti was lost in the pre-invasion planning and coordination. Without such a useful tool, cultural proclivities such as the military's desire to take control in the absence of authority came to the surface. In Cap Haitien, for example, representatives from the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division and the Coast Guard collaborated closely as one observer noted, "We had our tents pitched next to each other, but the third tent was missing – the USAID tent....There was no one to answer our questions about civilian assistance capabilities for 30 days into the operation."<sup>12</sup>

As Operation Uphold Democracy continued to unfold on the ground, other breaks in lines of communication brought on by poor interagency coordination continued to emerge. The military's role in Uphold Democracy arguably diminished after President Aristide resumed office and General Cedras and his allies left Haiti. In achieving this goal, focus predictably shifted to humanitarian support where the missions of the civilian agencies rose to an equal level of importance with the military's continual mission of providing a safe and secure environment. Over the months following the arrival of US forces, fractured lines of communication between the military and the interagency members solidified. This upturn in communication and coordination can be associated

with the flexibility of the organizations involved to find an agreeable solution to each problem encountered. Many of these unforeseen problems could have been eliminated or reduced in impact had the military and civilian agencies achieved unity of effort earlier through the interagency process.

### Operation Enduring Freedom

The 11 September 2001 attack on the United States was a cataclysmal event that changed the nation's foreign policy outlook and set the stage for military operations abroad. In less than two years, the US would find itself engaged in two major military operations, one in Afghanistan and the second in Iraq. These operations are separated by time with the first commencing a month after the September attack and the second commencing a year and a half later. Prior to these operations, the most recent military operation involving other civilian agencies was the 1998 intervention in war-torn Kosovo. As the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq unfolded, the degree to which the military and civilian agencies had made progress in achieving unity of effort became apparent, as did areas in which little progress had been made.

Operation Enduring Freedom commenced in October 2001 as the first stage in the GWOT. The primary goals of the operation included eliminating Al Qaeda and its terrorist camps as well as removing from power the Taliban regime that supported Al Qaeda. The short period between the attack on America and start of military action in Afghanistan significantly affected planning for civil-military integration. Due to the secretiveness of the operation, and lack of a generic pol-mil plan that could be used as a starting point, coordination between the military and civilian agencies was predictably ad hoc. Although the DoS and the military's Combatant Commander for the region would

work closely from the onset to secure basing and over flight rights, agencies focused on reconstruction in a post-war Afghanistan would play catch up.

Leading up to the start of OEF and throughout its execution, the military and the CIA worked closely together in the field. The CIA's role in the region as an intelligence-gathering agency was vital to US Central Command (CENTCOM). The agency's previous experience making and maintaining contacts with various factions fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan during the 1980s proved invaluable to shaping the OEF campaign. To facilitate coordination between the two organizations during pre-war planning sessions, the CENTCOM staff included a senior CIA officer that served as special advisor to the Commander.<sup>13</sup>

In planning for OEF, concerns that the military could become tied down in Afghanistan, as per the Soviet Union experience in the 1980s, led decision makers at the strategic level to call for a smaller US military footprint in the operation. This would enable the envisaged use of OEF as a launch pad for continued prosecution of the GWOT. Any action in Afghanistan would have to account for a populace and infrastructure that had suffered from over two decades of conflict. Congruent with the coming military action, humanitarian food drops would diminish the possibility of the populace suffering additionally from the effects of the impending war and thereby, be moved to fight against the US forces. The simultaneous dropping of bombs and food packages as OEF opened marked a first in contemporary warfare but it appears that this effort was a military orchestrated event.<sup>14</sup>

The international sentiment favoring US action following the 11 September attacks and ensuing OEF campaign allowed the military and civilian agencies, working

through the interagency process, to coordinate coalition support for the humanitarian support effort. Because the threat of wide scale famine was a paramount concern, CENTCOM, the unified command directing OEF, positioned a Coalition Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF) in theater with liaison cells located at the CENTCOM Headquarters in Tampa, Florida. These structures facilitated the coordination between the military, USAID representatives from the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), nongovernmental humanitarian assistance organizations, and coalition partners.

By summer of 2002, the interim Afghanistan government emerged in Kabul, the nation's capital. US military and paramilitary forces working alongside tribal groups had toppled the Taliban regime and pushed the Al Qaeda fighters deep into the country's rural and mountainous regions. With this pivotal event, planning for reconstruction, Phase IV in military parlance, moved to a higher priority. While the interim government was still getting established in Kabul, the security situation in the outlying areas was tenuous at best. As the campaign evolved, roving humanitarian assistance and liaison teams that were the forerunners of the later Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) augmented the stationary CMOCs established to coordinate military and civilian agencies.

The intent of the PRTs was to be multinational and interagency in nature. Comprised of various USAID, DoS, and NGO representatives, the PRTs utilized military assets for security and transportation into regions previously inaccessible to civilian agencies. The first PRT deployed into southeastern Afghanistan in December 2002, a year after the Taliban regime fell. This pairing of military and civilian assets provided the ability for reconstruction efforts to continue outside the limits of Kabul. This supported

the intent of seeing reconstruction efforts expand throughout the country. The emergence of the PRTs, which later formed within coalition forces, came about through the present security situation in Afghanistan as opposed to being part of a larger pre-conceived plan. The Bush administration did publish a pol-mil plan in March 2002, but it did not serve as a guide for the planning and initial execution of post conflict operations.<sup>15</sup>

It is too early to definitively assess the OEF campaign as either a success or failure with regard to the interagency process. It is clear that within the US government, the interagency process did not yield an ideal level of preparation and coordination amongst agencies.<sup>16</sup> This shortcoming is evident in the reactionary creation of the PRTs during the operation in response to the situation on the ground. Like Operation Uphold Democracy, agencies were able to overcome problems stemming from a lack of initial planning. Taking into consideration the short period of time in which the operation was conceived to when it was executed, a standing pol-mil plan may have mitigated some of the problems encountered during the operation if employed during the planning process.

#### Operation Iraqi Freedom

When planning began in earnest for a military incursion into Iraq is subject to conjecture. The numerous books and analytical coverage arising from the event suggest that it began concurrently with the onset of OEF. The political sensitivities surrounding a potential invasion of Iraq and the infighting that emerged between organizations in the interagency forum is well documented. Unlike the quick launch into Afghanistan's OEF that lessened the possibility for interagency coordination, any planning done for action in Iraq had the benefit of lessons incurred from previous operations as well as additional time. The problems the military and civilian agencies were called upon to counter in OIF

highlight how incomplete coordination at the strategic and operational level creates obstacles to efficiently accomplishing the mission.

By December 2001, the CENTCOM staff under General Tommy Franks produced the first iteration of the commander's concept for an invasion of Iraq.<sup>17</sup> CENTCOM retained oversight of any planning for Iraq since it fell within its area of responsibility. Due to ongoing diplomatic maneuvers, the planning done within the military proceeded under the tightest security. The OEF campaign requiring both military and civilian resources was still underway in Afghanistan. The eventual invasion of Iraq to achieve the goals of toppling the Hussein regime, securing weapons of mass destruction, and reducing Iraq's ability to provide any possible current or future support for terrorism began in March 2003.

The planning through the interagency process at both the strategic and operational level between December 2001 and March 2003 did not enable the military and civilian agencies to achieve unity of effort for the forthcoming Iraq campaign. The only consensus arriving through the interagency process during the interim timeframe was that maintaining the peace may be more difficult than winning the war itself. The arguments occurring between agencies at the strategic level over post war reconstruction, to provide for the strategic goal of a safe and secure environment in Iraq, as well as the reported arguments between DoD and DoS for going to war are beyond the scope of this paper. What is known is that a functioning plan for Phase IV of the operation was not complete before the war commenced in March. As noted by one account of the planning for post war Iraq, "On 17 March 2003, two days before the war began, ground force commanders

asked the Army War College for a copy of the handbook that had governed the US occupation of postwar Germany, which began in 1945.”<sup>18</sup>

Even with well-established links between the strategic and the operational level, the military, as a bureaucratic organization, is capable of developing internal breaks in lines of communication. In the months following the beginning of OIF, as the military was overcoming friction with postwar operations, former CENTCOM commander General Anthony Zinni inquired as to whether a previously run CENTCOM study on the feasibility of an invasion into Iraq and its post conflict implications was considered in pre-invasion planning. In a 23 December 2003 article, *Washington Post* correspondent Thomas Ricks reported the story noting,

So early in 1999 he (General Zinni then CENTCOM Commander) ordered that plans be devised for the possibility of the US military having to occupy Iraq. Under the code name “Desert Crossing,” the resulting document called for a nationwide civilian occupation authority, with offices in each of Iraq’s 18 provinces. That plan contrasts sharply, he notes, with the reality of the Coalition Provisional Authority, the US occupation power, which for months this year had almost no presence outside Baghdad – an absence that some Army generals say has increased their burden in Iraq. Listening to the administration officials testify that day, Zinni began to suspect that his careful plans had been disregarded. Concerned, he later called a general at Central Command’s headquarters in Tampa and asked, ‘Are you guys looking at Desert Crossing?’ The answer, he recalls, was ‘What’s that?’<sup>19</sup>

The previously run study, whether complete or not, apparently did not survive personnel turnover on the CENTCOM staff. By keeping the study within the organization instead of incorporating lessons learned with the other agencies, the loss of the plan at CENTCOM meant the study’s findings were lost to all.

Like the plan for “Desert Crossing,” the potential impact of the Future of Iraq (FOI) project on postwar integration of civil-military planning fell to the bureaucratic infighting that marks the interagency process.<sup>20</sup> The State Department ran the FOI project

that incorporated Iraqi exiles into collaborative working groups to cover planning for every conceivable facet of a post-Hussein Iraq. Edward Walker, a former assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern Affairs, helped the State Department with the project. In a July 2003 interview with *FRONTLINE* correspondent Martin Smith, Mr. Walker describes the fate of the project:

[Smith] Was this good postwar planning?

[Walker] I don't know. You never can tell, because it never got put into effect. But it was certainly intensive. It involved an awful lot of very bright people, many of whom have credentials in economics and banking and agriculture and so on, that you would at least have to take some count for what they say. As far as I know, it never got into the actual operations stage.

[Smith] But you expected it to? It was not just an idle exercise?

[Walker] Not at all.

[Smith] This was a real effort to plan?

[Walker] Right. To be there on the ground the day after and ready to go with some people designated already who could come in as Iraqis – who had the experience, who knew the situation – and work with some Iraqis that were already there, and ensure the continuation of a governing structure.

[Smith] So this was a real project to plan postwar Iraq. What happens to it?

[Walker] Well, as far as I know, there may have been some elements that were pulled into the Garner planning, and so on, that took place, or the proposal. But for the most part, I think it sits on somebody's desk somewhere – or is gathering dust somewhere.<sup>21</sup>

Given the number of agencies that had a stake in the post-war planning, and the political maneuvering of agencies through the interagency process at the strategic level, the project likely remained in Washington.

The Iraq war and its post war reconstruction tasks would develop issues that go beyond traditional bureaucratic boundaries. The government agencies that participated in planning for Iraq included the Departments of Defense, State, Agency for International

Development, CIA, Justice, Energy, Treasury and Commerce. By July 2002, at least six working groups formed to plan and coordinate for post-war Iraq to include:

1. Interagency Iraq Political-Military Cell (Including NSC, DoD, DoS, CIA): This staff-action-officer level group focused on formulating an integrated strategic effort to set the conditions for Iraq's transition to stability and sovereignty.

2. Interagency Executive Steering Group (Including NSC, DoD, DoS, CIA): This NSC-chaired Deputy Under Secretary level meeting addressed strategic planning and policy recommendations.

3. Interagency Humanitarian/Reconstruction Group (Including NSC, DoD, DoS, CIA, Treasury, Justice, USAID): This group prepared plans for any immediate relief operations and longer term reconstruction efforts in Iraq.

4. Interagency Energy Infrastructure Working Group (Including DoD, DoS, CIA, Energy): This group prepared plans for repairing and operating the Iraqi oil industry to return oil industry output to pre-war levels.

5. Interagency Coalition Working Group (DoD, DoS): This group coordinated the military requirements, diplomatic strategy, and strategic support necessary to build and maintain coalition support throughout the war.

6. Office of Global Communications (DoD, DoS, USAID, Justice, Treasury, US military): This group coordinated the public affairs efforts to counter the Iraqi regime's disinformation campaign.<sup>22</sup>

The nature and representation found in these groups demonstrate that some sharing of information at the strategic level was occurring over half a year prior to the invasion.

Concurrent with these interagency working groups, planning continued for post-war Iraq

within CENTCOM Headquarters in Tampa and in its forward command post in Qatar. The horizontal integration of planning and the sharing of information between groups at the operational level are not evident. Late integration of agency plans, bureaucratic turf battles, and selective use of information, such as the information garnered through the DoS's Freedom of Iraq Project prohibited the formulation of a coherent plan for civil-military operations.<sup>23</sup>

In preparation for post-war Iraq, the DoD created the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) in January 2003. Since DoD was the lead agency for Iraq's reconstruction, ORHA would report to Secretary Rumsfeld's office thereby streamlining the reporting chain. This new office, created just two months before the start of the Iraq war, would integrate the different agencies' plans at the operational level. The first function of this new office would be to merge the post-war planning done within the vertical stovepipes of agencies involved in planning for post-war Iraq. Former Army General Jay Garner accepted the position as ORHA's head administrator and began forming the office from scratch in late January 2003. In February, ORHA's participants met at National Defense University to de-conflict post-war planning and rehearse the actions of the various agencies and their representatives. In a recent interview, General Garner described the February meeting,

So by the third week in February, we had enough people. We probably had somewhere between 70 to 100 people. We had most of the plans, 90 percent of the plans. We were able to get everybody together in one place and vet those plans.

What we did, we put together in two days, we called it a rock drill – you turn over all the rocks. We went to National Defense University over at Fort McNair. We brought in our whole team, all the plans, and then the assistant or deputy secretary of the agency that was responsible for that plan, who was not on the team, but was responsible for supporting the team or developing that plan. We

had standing-room only people over there; we had several hundred people there. We brought in CENTCOM. . . So we had all the interagency, all those guy's bosses, us, and the military.

We spent two days vetting all the plans, which was really useful, because then we began to find out where all the dots were and what we had to do to connect each one of those dots. For example, the State Department does an awful lot of work in police and building police forces and looking at prisons and jails and courts, and the Justice Department does a lot of that. So we were able to connect those dots together, put together a composite Justice Department-State Department team.

It was a good drill, and we were able to put everything together and begin to horizontally coordinate all the plans. From that point on, we continued to do that all the way until the time we left here, all the time we were in Kuwait, until we deployed in Baghdad.<sup>24</sup>

The collaborative benefits derived from the conference at Fort McNair did not transfer overseas. Like Afghanistan, fears of widespread famine motivated civilian planners to seek pre-positioning of relief supplies in Kuwait. Despite close coordination between USAID and the military in the month leading up to the war, the head of USAID, Andrew Natsios, could get neither the Pentagon's permission to pre-position supplies thought necessary or get release of funds for rebuilding Iraq.<sup>25</sup> The security situation on the ground in Iraq, damage sustained to Iraq's governmental ministry buildings from looting, and unsigned reconstruction contracts hampered ORHA's deployment into Iraq and establishment of reconstruction projects immediately following the invasion. The slow release of funds critical for the civilian agencies to begin operating in theater compounded problems brought about through late civil-military planning. As General Garner relates, "...the money wasn't appropriated in time, the contracts didn't get signed in time. In fact, I tracked 13 contracts that had to do with reconstruction, government, had to do with schools, local governments, police, agriculture, infrastructure build, that type of thing. Of those 13 contracts, 10 weren't signed until after the war started. The major

contract, the big reconstruction contract, wasn't signed until the middle of May [2003]."<sup>26</sup>

In May 2003, former diplomat and ambassador-at-large L. Paul Bremer became the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq. This organization stood up to replace ORHA as the oversight body for Iraq's reconstruction and transition to democratic rule. The results of the sixty days provided to General Garner to pull the interagency plans together prior to the war commencing, plus the slow development of ORHA's work once in theater due to numerous problems, were now the responsibility of the CPA. Unlike the OEF campaign, which enjoyed robust international support that made up for insufficient prewar planning, the Iraq war's international unpopularity had a devastating effect on international support for Iraq's reconstruction. This meant that greater emphasis would fall on the civil-military integration and unity of effort not prepared for in the pre-war planning for Iraq.

Like OEF in Afghanistan, it is too early to definitively assess ongoing operations in OIF as strictly an interagency process failure. There is, however, no shortage of criticism aimed at the outputs of the interagency process with regard to postwar planning. The initial frustrations arising from post-war reconstruction indicate cross-agency planning and coordination did not occur in a manner which would facilitate success. The time lost in Iraq transitioning from combat to reconstruction and stability operations undoubtedly contributed to the poor security environment in Iraq following the ouster of Hussein.

<sup>1</sup>Margret D.Hayes and Gary F. Wheatley, *Interagency and Political –Military Dimensions of Peace Operations: Haiti – A Case Study* (Washington, DC: NDU, 1996), 25.

<sup>2</sup>Walter E. Kretchik, Robert F. Baumann, and John T. Fishel, *Invasion, Intervention, “Intervasion”: A Concise History of the U. S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CGSC Press, 1998), 43.

<sup>3</sup>John R. Ballard, *Upholding Democracy: The United States Military Campaign in Haiti, 1994-1997* (London: Praeger, 1998, 73.

<sup>4</sup> Kretchik, Baumann, and Fishel, 44.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., 44.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., 57.

<sup>7</sup>Ballard, 74.

<sup>8</sup>Hayes, 33.

<sup>9</sup>Kretchik, 71.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., 71.

<sup>11</sup>Hayes, 36.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., 38.

<sup>13</sup>General Tommy Franks, *American Soldier* (New York, NY: Regan Books), 2004, 211.

<sup>14</sup>The accounts of humanitarian aid packages dropped in various rural areas commencing with the start of military operations can be found in numerous resources but associated credit for the planning, preparation, and execution of this facet of the operation by any agency outside the military is not clearly stated.

<sup>15</sup>James Dobbins, John G. McGinn, Keith Crane, Seth G. Jones, Rollie Lal, Andrew Rathmell, Rachel Swanger, and Anga Timilsina, *America’s Role in Nation-Building* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND), 2003, 138.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., 137.

<sup>17</sup>Franks, 329.

<sup>18</sup>Warren P. Stobel and John Walcott, “Post-war Planning non-existent.” *Knight Ridder Newspapers*, 17 October 2004; available from <http://www.realcities.com/mld/krwashington/9927782.htm>; Internet; accessed on 10 February 2005.

<sup>19</sup>Thomas Ricks, ‘For Vietnam Vet Anthony Zinni, Another War on Shaky Territory,’ *Washington Post*, 23 December 2003, C01.

<sup>20</sup>Available information on the Future of Iraq project does not state definitively when the project started but suggests the project was in existence as early as 2000.

<sup>21</sup>Edward Walker, interview by Martin Smith, 11 July 2003, PBS *FRONTLINE* documentary “Truth, War, and Consequences.” This transcript may be referenced on the web at <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/truth/interviews/walker.html>; Internet; accessed on 30 January 2005.

<sup>22</sup>Unclassified report titled “Pre-war Planning for Post-war Iraq.” This report can be found on the web at [http://www.defenselink.mil/policy/isa/nesa/postwar\\_iraq.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/policy/isa/nesa/postwar_iraq.html); Internet; accessed on 12 February 2005.

<sup>23</sup>The Freedom of Iraq Project is discussed later in the following chapter.

<sup>24</sup>General Jay Garner, interview by Martin Smith, 17 July 2003, PBS *FRONTLINE* documentary “Truth, War & Consequences.” This transcript may be referenced on the web at: <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/truth/interviews/garner.html>; Internet; accessed on 30 January 2005.

<sup>25</sup>Stobel.

<sup>26</sup>General Jay Garner.

## CHAPTER 4

## ANALYSIS

### Introduction

The purpose of chapter 4 is to identify and analyze factors that lead to breaks in lines of communication and lines of authority. These breaks, identified through the case studies, hinder establishing unity of effort at the operational level. Following the methodology discussed in chapter 2, sequential attention to supporting questions, incorporating the limited resources highlighted in chapter 2, provides indicators of where problems arise through the interagency process. By analyzing the existing procedures for interagency planning and coordinating, the differing methods by which agencies approach planning, interagency process shortfalls, and whether greater initiative bestowed upon the interagency representatives will remedy the problem of poor coordination, enough evidence combines to answer the primary research question.

### Primary Research Question

How are problems achieving unity of effort between military and nonmilitary organizations through the interagency process at the operational level impacted by organizational structure, operational framework, and organizational culture?

The case studies of operations in Haiti, Afghanistan, and Iraq demonstrate that with each operation, the interagency process is fraught with difficulties. The problems of poor early coordination during the planning phase seem to carry over to each subsequent operation. The planning and coordinating shortfalls for operations in Haiti have at their root the same causes that influenced the planning and coordinating for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Why these problems are systemic must be due to factors which

transcend one single facet of the interagency process which theoretically could be identified and fixed.

**What Formalized Procedures Exist for Planning and Coordinating Between Military and Nonmilitary Agencies Within the Operational Level Interagency Process?**

The current process for coordinating between civilian and military organizations at the operational level through the interagency process relies on the unified commander's staff and CMOCs, or JCMOC if established in theater. Civilian organizations do not maintain standing structures at the operational level for the sole purpose of coordinating with other organizations. Organizations like DoS and USAID maintain structures like embassies, consulates, and missions but these narrowly focus into their respective country. As such, the desire to coordinate with the military or other organizations centers on their parochial view of the problem as it relates to their "home turf."

Aside from the military, no other agency that operates in the interagency process maintains a structure to oversee coordination at the operational level. This absence of an overarching body responsible for ensuring coordination, plus lack of doctrine to guide coordination itself by describing established lines of communication and lines of authority, leaves the coordinating process dependant on the organizational culture of the organizations involved in the interagency process. The function of the NSC, as the primary interagency coordinating body in Washington, does not provide for a sub-agency to oversee interagency coordination at either the strategic or operational level.

Adding to lack of structures and doctrine is the problem of organizations involved at the operational level looking at the world through notably different lenses. Following

the National Security Act of 1947 establishing unified commands, and the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act defining roles, responsibilities, and lines of communication for the unified commands, the military looks at the world in five distinct regions.<sup>1</sup> Only the NSC<sup>2</sup> and the DoS<sup>3</sup> are aligned with both dividing affairs into six distinct regions. The most active agency outside the military and diplomatic realm, USAID, divides and manages its overseas operations into four regionally focused bureaus.<sup>4</sup> This misalignment of regions results in each agency having to coordinate, in the case of Africa for example, with several different bureaus within another agency.

Exacerbating the problem of seeing the world differently is the degree of authority bestowed to the regional leaders in the different organizations. The unified commanders are the senior military officers in their region and are responsible for all the military operations that take place inside their area of responsibility. They have a direct link to the Secretary of Defense and, in time of conflict, to the President as well. Conversely, the ambassadors, being the President's representatives, carry significant clout but are concerned primarily, almost exclusively, with their assigned country. The assistant secretaries of state overseeing the regional bureaus have less commensurate power than the ambassadors have in the field. This confuses lines of authority, especially so in peace operations where the lead agency arrangement defining who is in charge and who is in a supporting role may not be clear. In Operation Uphold Democracy, for example, the US Embassy tried to task the military to conduct certain types of operations but Major General Kinzer, the military commander, resisted with the rational that the soldiers under his command were participating in a UN not US operation.<sup>5</sup> As US relations with Afghanistan and Iraq prior to GWOT were poor, the US did not maintain embassies in

either country, hence, military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq did not have to contend with friction arising with coordination efforts between the embassy and the military operation.

Allison's models help explain the operational framework wherein planning and coordination through the interagency process takes place at the operational level. Model I would suggest that not having a standing structure empowered with overarching supervision of interagency coordination is a deliberate choice made by the US government. A more likely explanation is that utilizing the military for this function, given its worldwide focus, presence overseas, and planning culture, is the best choice from a short list of alternatives. The consequences of this choice include leaving the coordination process open to organizational constraints for civilian agency representation overseas and, without a permanent lead agency to oversee coordination, forcing an agreement among organizations through bureaucratic bargaining.

Model II explains the differing regional alignment amongst organizations for planning operations abroad as a matter of parochial priorities and established routines. It is logical that regionally aligning the various organizations is a precursor to achieving unity of effort. The choice of how each agency subdivides the world for planning purposes reflects how the agency seeks efficiency through organization for accomplishing its prescribed mission. Another facet influencing how an agency organizes is budgetary constraints. The internal organization within an agency will be constrained by how large of a staff the agency can afford to maintain, and subsequently, availability of resources to enable additional organizational subdivisions of labor. Therefore, organizational leadership has determined that the current regional alignment brings the

most efficiency to the organization's processes and therefore does not require change. Any revision to an existing system must therefore address the central question: what is best for the organization? Organizational behavior prohibits sacrifice of internal efficiency in order to adopt a system that would make external efficiency (i.e. the interagency process) stronger.

Building upon Model II's explanation of why representation in the interagency process at the operational level is unbalanced, Model III demonstrates how nonmilitary agency decisions must occur at the strategic level. Using this model, each of the organizations has an interest in operational level coordination. However, the presence, responsibilities, and authority of the leadership at this level are unbalanced between organizations. For example, the unified commander does not have a civilian peer with commensurate responsibilities and authority for making decisions in theater. Since the organizational outputs in this model are products of bureaucratic bargaining, the bargaining must take place at the strategic level where the agency leaders are closer in stature. In addition organizational leaders have no incentive to bargain within the interagency process which does not provide opportunities to enhance their own position within their bureaucracy.

Study into enhancing operational level interagency coordination between military and civilian organizations began before the attacks of 11 September 2001.<sup>6</sup>

Previous civil-military operations to include those in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, strengthened the military's efforts into finding a mechanism that would provide the elusive unity of effort between organizations desirable through the interagency process. USJFCOM experimented with a concept termed the Joint Interagency Coordination

Group (JIACG). The Joint Staff submitted the proposal for this organization to the NSC deputies committee that approved it and instructed the combatant commands to implement the concept in January 2002.<sup>7</sup> As conceptualized, JIACGs are “organized to provide interagency advice and expertise to combatant commanders and their staffs, coordinate interagency counter-terrorism plans and objectives, and integrate military, interagency, and host nation efforts.”<sup>8</sup> Although focused primarily in support of the GWOT, this structure has the capability to facilitate coordination and integration of organizations in the interagency process across the spectrum of military operations.

Another recent addition to the operational level interagency process is the DoS’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). The NSC and State developed this concept beginning in 2003 in response to post conflict planning difficulties in OEF/OIF and to the contemporary operational environment where the US is finding increasing roles in the affairs of failing, failed, and post-conflict states, and following perceived failure in Iraq. In July 2003, Congress approved S/CRS with its mission to “lead, coordinate, and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy.”<sup>9</sup> The structure of this sub-component of DoS adequately represents other organizations in the interagency process. Members of the S/CRS staff include representatives from State Department, USAID, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, Army Corps of Engineers, Joint Forces Command, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Treasury Department.<sup>10</sup>

The intent of these suborganizations of Defense and State, JIACG and S/CRS, are designed to strengthen agency coordination through the interagency process. These entities are organizational acknowledgements that the ad hoc approaches to a regional crisis are not enough. Although both, in theory, facilitate interagency coordination at the operational level by clearly defining roles and responsibilities, both will function without a binding interagency doctrine that requires other agencies to coordinate with these organizations. In short, these new creations close the gap existing in the interagency process but do not appear to have the organizational clout to solve the problem long term given the inevitable bureaucratic resistance and because no one is definitively in charge.

Using Model I analysis, the creation of JIACGs and S/CRS are logical choices made by DoD and DoS respectively. Each maintains interest in the efficiency of their operations overseas and each acknowledge how the action of the other organizations influences operations. Therefore creating these sub organizations reduces a level of uncertainty in the parent organization since the JIACG and S/CRS will exists to coordinate with others through the interagency process. The alternative to creating a specialized sub organization is further adherence to the status quo. The risk of uncertainty found in the status quo is greater thus; creation of sub organizations seems the optimal choice to remedy the problem of disjointed effort at the operational level.

Allison's model II provides some insight into the effect of these sub organizations on their parent organization. For the military and its vast resources, staffing JIACGs, and the JIACG mission, do not have a dramatic effect on the organization's other programs and repertoires. The JIACG is within its pattern of behavior as it seeks an increase in the ability to plan more efficiently for operations by making representatives of other agencies

available for consultation. The same does not hold true for DoS. The S/CRS mission imposes on DoS a new program with new set of tasks that competes inside the organization for available resources. Of note, the S/CRS makes two significant changes in DoS: it establishes an expeditionary mindset and a deliberate program for capturing lessons learned. These are new programs imposed on the organization. The implementation of these additional programs will be subject to organizational culture during implementation and thus, their importance to the agency will depend on the personality of the agency leadership.

Model III analysis suggests that the creation of JIACGs and the S/CRS will provide their parent organizations additional power through the interagency process at the operational level by giving each another agent to ensure its interests are represented in the interagency process. Each, in the composition of their staff, maintains representation from outside agencies that can render agency specific interests and expertise when planning and coordinating an operation. Deriving consensus on the staff for a recommended action will then entail buy-in from the other agency representatives. This reduces the likelihood that another agency will oppose a specific action since its interests came under consideration during formulation of the plan. The main detractor of these new sub organizations is the fact that they add another layer to the bureaucracy complete with competing priorities, patterns of behavior, and limited flexibility for change.

Likewise, the impact of organizational culture on the interagency process is unchanged by arrival of these sub organizations. The unified commander still does not have a peer at the operational level. Without one, he still enjoys overwhelming influence in his assigned region. The necessity of working closely together, however, is well known

despite differences in organizational culture that exist between the agencies. General Franks comments on this relationship in his book, *American Soldier*, by noting,

The State Department, which is responsible for international relations and diplomacy, posts ambassadors to the United Nations and most of the sovereign nations on the planet. On a given day, Colin Powell uses this network to advance US policies that range from human rights to commercial interests. Similarly, the Defense Department has senior military officers in virtually every country – working with the ambassadors on security and military matters. It's as if each department were an octopus, its tentacles reaching around the world. In many cases, military decisions and objectives affect an ambassador's ability to do his job; likewise, the priorities of our ambassadors regularly effect the work being done by the military.

Each of these departments, too, is a huge bureaucracy. Each comes complete with hundreds of personalities, many of them contending for power, and angling to ensure that any given decision goes their way. Over the past year I'd seen considerable friction develop between the departments. In many cases State viewed Defense as a bunch of hawks – advocating military action without regard for regional or international consequences. And Defense viewed State as a bunch of bureaucrats, fond of having meetings and writing papers, but slow to act on important issues. The truth was probably to be found between the poles, but one thing was for sure: There was insufficient trust between the departments.<sup>11</sup>

The same tenuous relationship between the military and the civilian led CPA in Iraq initially hindered productive coordination following the departure of General Franks and ORHA head General Garner. In Iraq, the military's focus on its mission to defeat threats to security and the CPA's mission to provide stability and post-war recovery seem to be complementary. Cultural divisions and lack of established mechanisms for coordinating agencies can perhaps explain some breaks in communication between agencies leading to a disjointed unity of effort. Another possible explanation lies in the composition of various personalities heading the organizations that may override whatever coordinating processes are in place. Bradley Graham, a *Washington Post* correspondent, reported in November 2004 that General George Casey and CPA head George Negroponte saw their work as intertwined:

The strong working tie that many here said has formed between the four-star general and the veteran diplomat contrasts sharply with the strained relations that existed between their predecessors, Lt. Gen. Richardo Sanchez and L. Paul Bremmer. According to onetime subordinates on both sides, communication and coordination were sorely lacking between Sanchez's military command and the Coalition Provisional Authority, which Bremmer ran.

It didn't work before. It was as bad as I've ever seen it," said a diplomat who has been in Baghdad during both periods. "For example, we went through the first battles of Fallujah and Najaf last spring without ever having a clear idea of where the military was, what the timeline was. So political advice was essentially worthless, because it was given in a vacuum of what the military realities were.

As a sign of how things have changed since the new order began in July, senior embassy officials now attend Casey's morning update briefing and are kept apprised of major military operations. Similarly, officers on Casey's staff huddle regularly with embassy officials deliberating on political and economic moves.<sup>12</sup>

The difference in working relationships between Sanchez and Bremmer vice Casey and Negroponte demonstrates how the emphasis placed on reaching across bureaucratic lines will impact the conduct of the operation.

Using Model I, the quality of coordination between agencies is a matter of each agency choosing whether to reach out to other agencies vice operating in relative seclusion from outside influence. The success of the military's mission in Iraq hinges in part on the success of the CPA in stabilizing the country's government and infrastructure to a point where it is self-sufficient. The rational choice then is to coordinate closely so that the operations of each are complementary. The alternative is deliberately choosing to work in isolation to maintain absolute control of the situation in terms of pursuing interests, but at a cost of expending ever-increasing organizational resources. A rational actor would thus promote and protect unity of effort between agencies. Fractures in coordination between agencies influencing unity of effort must then derive from more than a simple choice not to work together.

Model II suggests how agencies through their individual processes and outputs can thwart coordination with other agencies. Each organization focuses its efforts on accomplishing sequential goals within the confines of an operation that may differ from those of other agencies. An organization's focus will be greatest on a particular part of an operation in which it has the greatest stake. For example, although the overall security and stability of Iraq is the paramount goal, the military will focus on the tactical battle at hand over the current progress of another agency's long-term project (i.e. CPA work to establish a functioning Iraqi infrastructure) that over time may make its own operation easier to accomplish.

As shown through Model III analysis, the differing interests and stakes amongst organizations in an operation contribute to how well the organizations coexist and achieve unity of effort. The bureaucracy within each organization reflects its culture and its determination to see organizational goals fulfilled. Even if the leaders of two organizations see their success as interrelated, such as the case of Casey and Negroponte in Iraq, harmonious relations between the two organizations is not a given unless the leaders of each ensure that their subordinates carry the same view. Unless this attitude permeates throughout both organizations, unity of effort achieved between the leaders of both organizations will be lost to the friction developed between representatives interacting at the lower levels of the coordination process.

The only standing organizational structures for facilitating operational level interagency coordination rest within the military. During operations in theater, these coordinating mechanisms are the unified commander's staff and the CMOCs established on the ground. Operational level coordination is, for the most part, absent from existing

doctrine or standard operating procedures. Unlike the interagency process at the strategic level with an institutionalized forum for coordinating across agencies in the NSC Deputy and Principal meetings, the operational level coordination is dependant on personnel availability and individual proclivity for reaching across bureaucratic lines.

The lack of doctrine guiding the interagency process at the operational level is significant. For achieving unity of effort between agencies, it is necessary to provide an overarching framework for coordination complete with codified procedures for planning and execution through the interagency process. Doctrine can serve as a vehicle for clarifying agency roles, responsibilities, and the mechanics of interagency coordination. The current procedures for planning and coordinating between military and nonmilitary agencies at the operational level are informal. Compounding the problems brought on by lack of doctrine, there is not one overarching agency responsible for ensuring coordination and planning amongst agencies. This leaves the efficiency of the interagency process dependent upon the actions of the individual agencies and their leaders with their differing planning capabilities, interests, motivations, and priorities.

How Do the Military and Nonmilitary Agencies Differ  
in Their Approach to Planning and Coordinating  
at the Operational Level?

The military unquestionably relies on thorough, deliberate planning for all facets of an operation. In this regard, officer training stresses the importance of detailed planning throughout their careers. In each organization above the company level, staff organization traditionally provides for one section to be responsible for planning. With each increase in the level of command, the staffing of this planning section increases in number and specialization. For the military, detailed planning is the chief method for

mitigating uncertainty in the operation. The commander reviews the plan, chooses the best course of action, makes revisions, and rehearses the plan prior to executing the operation. This cyclic process produces a near predictable outcome where detailed analysis and rehearsal precedes the operation.

The formal, sequential problem solving process that marks military planning is not limited to the problem at hand. The military organization further divides planning into near and far term objectives. In each planning cycle, investigation into available options followed by war-gaming, yield sequels and branch plans. There are two types of planning: deliberate and hasty, or deliberate and “crisis action plans” in civilian parlance. Without regard to time pressures or nature of the operation, the methodology is the same. Facts are gathered, assumptions are made, analysis into consequences and choices between courses of action that best support success are weighed until the final product, the operations order, is disseminated to those that will execute it.

The civilian agencies do not routinely possess sub organizations that exist only to produce plans for future action.<sup>13</sup> The problem solving mechanisms found in civilian agencies typically consist of forming groups to analyze policy and generating options before contemplating any potential action. The governing precursor to action is then consensus amongst the group. This pattern closely follows the decision making process in the interagency process at the strategic level where policy coordination committees form to review a matter and make recommendation to pass up the chain for further review and concurrence.

The organizational interests in the contemplated operation also drive the planning process. For example, USAID with its mission of providing humanitarian support in a

region consumed by a crisis will be proactive in coordinating with the military and other agencies as plans for the operation are developed. The nature of the operation, however, can hamper coordination. If the initial nature of the military mission is unclear, as in the case of Uphold Democracy, civilian agencies may not know what requirements they are expected to supply or are capable of supplying in the operation. Further, civilian agencies may have a different suspense in solving a potential problem. Whereas the military may request information immediately from civilian agencies to solidify plans thereby maximizing time available for rehearsals and preparations, the civilian agencies may see the military's planning for an operation as being overly rushed.

Another hindrance to civilian planning capabilities is the budgetary constraints imposed on the agency. Using USAID as an example, obtaining contracts for reconstruction projects is not possible before the necessary funding passes to the organization. Without having a ready supply of money for the operation, agencies like USAID can only submit what they plan to do as opposed to what they are ready to do. In planning for Uphold Democracy, USAID agreed to establish a jobs program in Haiti and in conjunction with the Department of Justice to set up a judicial system. Neither happened because of USAID's inability to acquire and transfer funds.<sup>14</sup>

Using Model I analysis, the military's penchant for maintaining operational security explains its secretive handling of OPLAN 2370 for intervention into Haiti. The choice of excluding other agencies during the early planning stages isolated the military from any unwelcome assistance other agencies might have provided which would have derailed the planning process. In addition, the military's secretiveness supported the requirement that any military planning be kept from leaking into the news, thereby

jeopardizing ongoing diplomatic maneuvers. The formation of the interagency working groups to address the Haiti situation demonstrates how individual agencies can choose to take proactive measures toward problem solving but is limited in effectiveness by availability of information.

Model II further explains this as a product of the organization's standard pattern of behavior. In planning for Haiti, the military was following standard procedures by initiating planning early and keeping the information within the organization until it was necessary to execute the plan. The centralized control of the planning process prohibited the ability of other agencies to contribute early in the planning cycle. Model II also explains why the military's intent focus on impending combat in Afghanistan and Iraq, in line with its parochial priorities, naturally precluded more detailed planning for the post-conflict phases of the operation.

Model III analysis demonstrates how organizational behavior in the planning process revolves around interests, stakes, positions, and power. As lead agency for operations in Haiti, Afghanistan, and Iraq, the military's interest and stakes in the operations are self-evident. The military's position in the planning process and the associate power it maintains determines who in the interagency process gets input into the plan. USAID, for example, with much less power but equal interest in the operation's success, does not carry sufficient weight in the planning process due to its organizational size, budgetary constraints, and its perceived supporting role. These deficiencies contributed to USAID making plans for operations in Haiti without having the resources to carry through on its agreed deliverables.

As discussed, the only agency capable of executing detailed planning throughout its levels of organization is DoD. This agency is also the only one that has the ability to coordinate interagency actions at the operational level from standing structures. The intentional fractioning of power between the Pentagon and the unified commands allows each to execute simultaneous planning and coordination with other agencies to achieve unity of effort. Thus, having the only tool available for operational level interagency coordination, the military naturally makes civilian agencies more reluctant to coordinate in a forum dominated by the military.

In the case of “Desert Crossing” and FOI project, organizational culture and the lack of an institutionalized process for coordinating between agencies contributes to cases such as these where potentially beneficial information is not disseminated. In lieu of an established forum that forces the exchange of information, the planning inside agencies takes precedent over reaching across bureaucratic lines. Since ORHA fell under DoD’s overview, as DoD was the lead agency for post-war reconstruction in Iraq, planning initiated between these two organizations initiated as soon as General Garner took the ORHA lead. As CENTCOM commander General Tommy Franks notes,

Over the weeks ahead, Jay Garner and I would meet; he would build a team of specialists and experts from across the US government, deploy the team to Kuwait, establish links with our commanders on the ground, and prepare to enter Iraq on the heels of our attacking troops.

Jay and his team spent countless hours with the CENTCOM staff and the key planners on the Joint Staff and in OSD, hammering out processes and procedures that would place US Army civil affairs specialists in every province in Iraq.<sup>15</sup>

Looking at the framework for interagency planning at the operational level using Allison’s models helps explain why information sharing is difficult. Model I analysis suggests that the choice of not retaining the “Desert Crossing” plan, in part or whole, or

not including FOI's work into plans for Iraq was a conscious decision made by the military after weighing all available options. This hypothesis lacks legitimacy since there appears to be little by way of alternatives to the information garnered through either "Desert Crossing" or the FOI project. In this light, two possible but linked explanations arise. First, the desire to maintain centralized control of the planning process led to discarding information generated from other agencies or from within the same agency but generated under different leadership. Second, conflicts between the leadership of organizations regarding the identification and pursuit of goals threatened to debilitate planning for the operation in Iraq. The degree that organizations view a problem and its potential solutions differently directly contributes to the amount of cooperation found between agencies during the planning process.

Through the Model II lens, the creation of "Desert Crossing" fits the predictable planning program found in the military. To avoid future uncertainty, the CENTCOM staff, under direction of the commander, initiated planning for an operation that at the time was far from imminent. The centralized coordination and control of this plan precluded other agencies from garnering the same lessons even though a future Iraq invasion was only hypothetical. The secretive planning is part of the organization's standard pattern of behavior. Other agencies, with their limited flexibility for planning, likely focused on their sequential attention to goals which did not include a future post-war Iraq. As Allison notes, "Organizations exhibit great reluctance to base actions on estimates of an uncertain future. Thus choice procedures that emphasize short-run feedback are developed."<sup>16</sup>

Model II also explains how, with the increasing possibility of a war in Iraq, the State Department formed the FOI project as part of a problem directed search. Their planning programs rely on using human contact with the problem to generate agency options that do not remove the freedom to change course as the problem itself changes. This follows their standard pattern of behavior where engaging foreign sources for collaboration then building consensus through working groups is preferable to generating options in relative isolation. By incorporating as many foreign experts as possible, State's working groups enabled short-term feedback into the ways and means considered for use in securing a stable post-war Iraq.

Looking at both cases using Model III, the choice of using or discarding information is consistent with organizational behavior based on stakes, positions, and relative power each organization has concerning the others. Although the exact reason “Desert Crossing” disappeared is unknown, the possibility exists that the arrival of a new Defense Secretary, and his desire to “think out of the box,” caused subordinate staffs to discard existing plans.<sup>17</sup> This supports the organization’s actions as a matter of interests, where efficiency is the goal and perceptions may exist that the work done in the past does not recognize the desires of the organization today. Since DoD was the lead agency for Iraq reconstruction, and firmly in position to influence the outcome, its motivation to retain control may explain why the FOI project with emphasis on actions not in line with military objectives was not warmly received.

The impact of organizational culture plays a significant part in the interagency planning process. Each organization exists, theoretically, to perform specified tasks in a defined arena. The contemporary environment produces a mix of problems that require

the efforts and unique capabilities of several agencies. A hindrance to garnering unity of effort can be as simple as the various organizations viewing the base problem differently. Developing clear and commonly shared objectives is a precursor for unity of effort. Without this, dividing tasks amongst agencies is certain to be fraught with difficulty.

The stakes each organization has in an operation weighs against the potential cost to the organization if it relinquishes either assets or power to another. These organizational assets and associated power define the “turf” wherein an organization maintains a sphere of influence into the operation. The interagency process contains competition for scarce resources. As Mendel and Bradford note in their 1995 work *Interagency Cooperation: A Regional Model for Peace Operations*, “Turf issues will continue as a dominating factor in the quest for interagency cooperation and integration, but they can be overcome by civilian and military leadership.”<sup>18</sup> These “turf battles” receive fuel from organizational ignorance into the other’s capabilities, penchant for planning, and reliance, as in the case of the military, on a detailed plan prior to executing the operation. Other organizations such as DoS can feel threatened by tying their actions to a formalized plan. This can cause reluctance to work with the military when freedom of maneuver for pursuing diplomatic goals falls under the influence of any prearranged agreement with DoD.

Another cultural hindrance to achieving unity of effort is the reliance, or lack thereof, on standard operating procedures. For the military, the inability to predict civilian agency outputs according to a standard operating procedure means that the military cannot predict results. The military’s cultural proclivity for taking over planning and coordination, when there is no clearly defined agency in charge of an operation, is

also a deterrent to interagency cooperation. The military's reliance on doctrine coupled with its take-charge attitude makes it seem inflexible to the requirements of other agencies.

Territorial issues are clearer in the field where the military dominates activity on the ground. In part due to the need for maintaining operational security, the military operates separate from civilian agencies and requires coordination only when external services are required. The CMOC that serves to coordinate civil-military operations may cause civilian agencies to view it as trying to command and control civilian agencies or stiff-arming them to guard against interference with the current operation. A reluctance to collocate on the ground with civilian agencies and desire for coordination only when civilian agency services are required, such as USAID for combating famine, contribute to the civilian agencies being suspect of the military's desire for working together.

The desire for the civilian agency representatives working in a troubled region to have the local populace see the military completely separate from the civilian agencies also influences civil-military coordination. At the same time, the civilian agencies with less expeditionary assets may require the military to provide material assets as well as security. Civilian agencies requiring military security while working in Afghanistan came in conflict with the military when some of the security elements donned civilian attire while performing the security mission. For the military, authorizing security detachments to wear civilian clothing increased force protection by making the soldiers less of a readily identifiable target for enemy combatants. Although security for the civilian workers was paramount concern, this action of dressing in civilian clothes caused the civilian agency workers to feel threatened by being mistaken for soldiers should shooting

commence. As reported in the Washington Post, the issue rose to the level of the NSC where national security advisor Condoleezza Rice received a letter from 16 organizations asking the administration to review this policy.<sup>19</sup>

The size and capabilities of the civilian agencies can also be an impediment to coordination. The military, for example, with its numbers of personnel and equipment are far more capable of handling a multitude of tasks than a smaller organization such as USAID. This in combination with unwillingness of the personnel in the organizations to reach across bureaucratic lines can lead to each organization seeing the other as being unsupportive. This results in friction between agencies such as in Haiti when “the Secretary of Defense’s Office of Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs assigned personnel to respond to USAID’s requests but found that USAID did not reciprocate and, in fact, refused the military’s request for assistance that could have tied up USAID personnel.”<sup>20</sup>

Theoretically, identifying the degree that agencies require assistance from other agencies occurs early in the planning process for an operation. The methodical versus policy-focused approach to planning differs between agencies as do requirements for a well-synchronized plan. The military maintains large staffs throughout each level of command dedicated to planning for an operation. This does not hold true for their civilian agency counterparts. The smaller planning staffs in the civilian agencies, guided by a different perspective on the operation at hand, is a source of friction toward achieving unity of effort.

What Are the Shortfalls That Arise Through the Interagency Process  
at the Operational Level That Cause a Break in Lines of  
Communication and Lines of Authority?

The structures of the various agencies that interact at the operational level through the interagency process are significantly different. Their capacity for influencing operations at this level is contingent on staffing, funding, and organizational interest. By nature, operating at the operational level requires an expeditionary capability to exist within the organization. Although, to a degree, effective communication and coordination can take place from within Washington, the preponderance of operational related planning and coordinating activities takes place abroad in the various regions of the world. Looking into the structures of the government agencies that interact at this level helps explain how unity of effort is difficult to achieve.

The DoD is without peer for influencing, by sheer numbers of staffing alone, in the operational level coordination that takes place through the interagency process. The National Security Act of 1947 created the unified command plan that today consists of nine commands. Of these commands, five are assigned geographical area responsibility. A unified command has a broad, continuing mission that comprises more than one military service. The commanders of unified commands, under the 1986 Nichols-Goldwater Act, are directly responsible to the President and Secretary of Defense for the readiness of forces and execution of missions within the assigned region of responsibility.

These unified commands maintain robust standing staffs that increase in number of assigned personnel based on the number of operations occurring in their region. Charged with maintaining readiness of forces assigned, they additionally serve as instruments of foreign policy implementation through vehicles such as maintaining

relations with foreign militaries in the region, conducting multinational military exercises, and responding to crisis in the region where US interests are at stake. Given the sheer number of countries that fall inside the individual unified commands' geographical area of responsibility, these commands, an extension of DoD, carry significant influence in the region and maintain the power to influence how other US government organizations interact with countries falling into the particular region. These unified commands are the only US government entities that have the capacity at the operational level to pull together interagency actions focused on any particular region.

Since unified commands carry such weight in the execution of US foreign policy, there are several tools available to assist these commanders. The commander's staff maintains a Political Advisor (POLAD) that works with the commander to translate strategic political goals into military objectives. These POLADs, staffed by Foreign Service officers from the State Department, provide the commander with information outside military channels. This is a symbiotic relationship where the POLAD, linked to DoS, can ensure that the commander's military view into the region receives representation in the diplomatic and political arenas. Conversely, political planners have an avenue to present foreign policy concerns to the commander on how military actions in the region may affect the diplomatic goals.

To support and manage the pursuit of US interests in the region, unified commanders produce a theater support cooperation plan that identifies, prioritizes, and dedicates resources to providing increased security and stability within the assigned region. Part of this cooperation plan incorporates the coordinated actions of agencies such as USAID to ensure resources inherently unavailable to the military contribute to the

mission. Close coordination with agencies such as USAID is maintained in an effort to provide unity of effort at the operational level. These take into account the goals and a vision of the other agencies operating in the region, the largest agency stakeholder in the strategy being successful is DoS.

The DoS fields some 200 ambassadors operating in 160 US embassies and consulates.<sup>21</sup> From the State Department in Washington, six regional bureaus manage these assets and their diplomatic missions. The geographic regions these bureaus cover do not align with the unified commands operating under those prescribed by the unified command plan. The influence of the individual ambassador on the military's actions in his particular country, however, is significant.

The ambassador serves as the President's personal representative overseas. As such, the ambassador has a direct link to the President and is not subordinate to the unified commander. For assistance, the ambassador has use of a country team staffed by various representatives outside the US government involved in the host nation. Representation on the country teams varies by diplomatic mission, but may include a defense attaché, security assistance organization, representatives of USAID, and other agencies as required. It is an informal organization with no set size, structure, or guidelines for operations. The purpose of the country team is to assist the ambassador by coordinating with other agencies, such as the unified commander, and making recommendations. It is not a decision making body.

Another agency that participates in the operational level interagency process is USAID. The mission of USAID is to support US foreign policy objectives by supporting the areas of economic growth, agriculture and trade, global health, democracy, conflict

prevention, and humanitarian assistance.<sup>22</sup> With headquarters in Washington, this independent organization manages field activities for 50 USAID missions over four regional areas. This organization takes foreign policy guidance from the DoS and works closely with State and DoD throughout the various regions. This agency, by its mission, is the most expeditionary of the government agencies outside DoD.<sup>23</sup> To perform its mission, the agency coordinates and contracts projects to US companies, private volunteer organizations, and nongovernmental organizations then monitors and directs implementation of these projects in the field.

Other agencies that can participate in the operational level interagency process include the Departments of Commerce, Justice, Treasury, Agriculture, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Energy, and the CIA. Of these, only the CIA with its mission to collect intelligence, provide all-source analysis, and conduct covert action by presidential directive, has the organizational structure to direct its actions across geographic regions.<sup>24</sup> The other agencies typically operate primarily through the interagency process at the strategic level in Washington as they are not budgeted and staffed to maintain deployable elements for operations overseas.

The effect of money on an agency's ability to operate overseas cannot be understated. In the government bureaucracy, access to money determines an agency's capabilities, bargaining power, and position in influencing operations. The relative size of each agency's "rice bowl" differs based upon how the US government allocates money through its fiscal budget. A glance at the discretionary spending levels afforded several agencies working at the operational level highlights the disparity in resources. For example, according to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in fiscal year 2006,

the federal budget affords DoD \$419.3 billion, DoJ \$20.3 billion, DoS \$13.3 billion, and USAID \$5 billion with sharing of an additional \$4.1 billion with DoS.<sup>25</sup>

This funding covers the operating costs of the agencies to include personnel training, equipping, and salaries. Outside the military, the ability to grow an agency's capabilities, such as making it expeditionary with a surge capacity for deploying personnel and resources overseas, is limited. Additional funding for operations beyond initial allocation requires a supplemental fund. This supplemental comes through Congress, adding another bureaucratic hurdle into the process of sustaining an agency's operations overseas. Thus, the question "who pays for it" not only influences what agencies are willing to do during the planning process, but whether an agency can deliver services once the operation is underway.

Model I analysis suggests that differing regional alignments and differing levels of responsibility afforded agency representatives in the field ties into the issue of money. It seems obvious that provided additional resources, agencies would expand to make overseas operations more efficient in execution. The Model I view also explains why agencies appear unwilling to take on every increasing responsibility for facets of an operation. A rational actor would expect an agency to increase its influence on the operation by taking on additional tasks. For example, DoS creating the S/CRS strengthens its position and influence in post-war planning. The limited resources on hand for sustaining existing organizational programs weighed against potential payoffs for taking on additional tasks, makes the prospect of deliberately expanding an agency's role in the operation for sake of gaining increased influence in the operation unlikely.

Using Model II analysis, the danger of taking on tasks not in line with the organization's operational objectives is another reason why agencies will be reluctant to change. Each agency's tasks and special capabilities performed in a routine manner strengthen the agency's cultural belief of what it can do and are willing to do. As Allison explains, "Primary responsibility for a narrow set of problems combines with the gritty, everyday requirements for action to produce distinctive sets of beliefs about how a mission should be implemented and what capacities are needed or wanted to perform it."<sup>26</sup> If the requirement then is for an agency to provide certain expeditionary capabilities to fulfill a specific task (i.e. post conflict reconstruction), but not often required to do so, then the agency would be more likely to define the requirement as more in line with somebody else's mission. This can explain why DoD, with its vast resources, did not create S/CRS.

Model III explains how the fragmentation of power and representation at the operational level makes achieving unity of effort difficult. As mentioned, despite the positioning of other agency representatives onto an agency's staff, such as a POLAD on the unified commander's staff, the decision-making authority is not equal amongst agencies at the operational level. Aside from the military's empowered unified commanders, the "Chiefs" of the other agencies remain at the strategic level of the interagency process leaving the operational level representation to a mix of "Staffers" and "Indians" that lack equal authority with the unified commander.<sup>27</sup> The result is shoveling of contentious issues between agencies up to the strategic level for resolution, thereby slowing and temporarily halting coordination at the operational level.

The imbalance of power and representation among agencies at the operational level, along with differing objectives and capabilities, combine to make achieving unity of effort difficult through the interagency process. The impact of money with regard to staffing operational level coordination structures as well as providing for expeditionary capabilities is also significant. Adding to the existing issues of insufficient coordinating mechanisms for day-to-day policy execution, the USG entities view the world using a different geographical framework. This exacerbates problems of agencies seeing regional issues in the same light.

Should Agencies Operating Through the Interagency Process  
at the Operational Level Allow Greater Authority  
to Its Representatives?

The question of how much authority to bestow agency representatives in the field hinges on several factors. The current methodology for conduct of an operation is to designate one entity as “lead agency” for an operation. This designation empowers the chosen agency to orchestrate the operation and thereby exert influence over all other involved agencies. For example, in Iraq, DoD became the lead agency for post-conflict reconstruction and thus oversight of the CPA fell to DoD. The influence granted to one agency as the “lead” impacts not only the degree that other agencies are willing to cede power to the lead agency but the manner in which they communicate in the field.

The interaction between agencies during an operation revolves around daily communication between agency representatives in the field. These representatives perform either in a liaison or coordination role. The difference between a coordinating versus liaison function determines whether the agency representative can obligate his parent organization to execute tasks and expend resources or simply exchange

information. Unless a representative from another agency, such as one from USAID placed on the unified commander's staff, is empowered to make decisions, then the timeliness of interagency information sharing and decision-making in the course of the operation will suffer. This difference between liaison and coordinating roles will affect the efficiency of organizations such as JIACGs in achieving unity of effort amongst agencies.<sup>28</sup>

The JIACG concept continues to undergo testing and revision. A January 2004 report titled *Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) Training and Survey Results*, noted that the mission and expectations of the JIACG are a few of the issues requiring resolution.<sup>29</sup> These three topics are central to whether the interagency community will embrace the JIACG concept. The survey highlights the cultural divide that permeates through out the interagency process. As one respondent noted, "The military doesn't understand their key value in providing a platform for interagency collaboration. The military thinks the interagency community is there to support them and really it' the other way around....The military has incredible resources that we don't have, so we get a lot of analytical and information resources back from them."<sup>30</sup> Another respondent, offered a different view, "Civilian agencies need to overcome their stereotypes about the military...the military does care, is intellectual, can play in their sandbox without being threatening, and there are common interests and goals and we need to work together."<sup>31</sup>

It is logical to believe that increased exposure of agency representatives to other agencies will lessen the cultural misconceptions inherent to the interagency process. The ability to recruit employees for service in a liaison role with another agency demonstrates

that agency's emphasis on bolstering relations through the interagency process. If the career effect were positive, recruitment would not be difficult. As the survey notes, the finding and training of JIACG members differs amongst agencies in terms of ease of recruitment, perceived career effect of JIACG assignment within agencies, internal agency resources allotted for JIACG staffing, training and educational opportunities afforded representatives, and requirements places on representatives for communicating with their parent agency.<sup>32</sup>

The interagency community outside the military does not have an incentive program for employees to gain experience serving in an exchange role with other agencies. Without an incentive program, civilian agency personnel may likely see such an assignment as negatively affecting career progression since the assignment would take the employee away from the inner workings of the agency and thus, "be out of the loop."<sup>33</sup> This view is not commensurate with how the military views interagency or inter service assignments. A provision in the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act requires officers in the military services to serve in a "joint" assignment prior to selection for general officer. The purpose of this provision is to ensure that future general officers have experience working alongside other services and therefore have a multi-service mindset. Establishing a similar mindset in the interagency community through such an incentive program is crucial to moving agencies toward a common understanding of each others culture, contributions, and capabilities.

Another obstacle to coordination is the simple concept of having a common language. Just as each agency has a unique organizational culture; it also maintains its own jargon for communicating amongst its agency representatives. This is particularly

true in the military where acronym laced conversations will not easily translate into something civilian agency representatives will understand. Devising a common terminology for use in the interagency process can promote understanding of problems and solutions. This simple step, like devising a doctrinal guide for interagency coordination, is a necessary ingredient for military and nonmilitary agencies to make the interagency process functional.

Under Model I analysis, the rational actor would limit the ability of representatives in the field to obligate the agency to undertake tasks not previously accepted by the agency head. The imbalance of power amongst agencies at the operational level requires retention of decision-making authority at the strategic level. By ceding power to representatives in the field, the agency head will lose the ability to bargain with other agencies on terms that are more favorable. For the civilian agencies, this retention of decision-making power away from the operational level is a means to check the influence of the military's ability to dictate agency contributions during an operation. The mistrust that exists between agencies prohibits decentralization of such authority to obligate agency resources.

The Model II view of organizational behavior explains why employees are reluctant to venture into assignments outside the parent agency. An organization's structure and culture define employee success by outlining clear avenues for internal advancement. Unless an agency recognizes assignments outside the agency as a benefit to the organization then avoiding such an assignment is the best course of action. Model II further suggests that organizations tend toward centralized coordination and control.

Empowering subordinates to obligate the agency in expending time and resources does not fit this paradigm.

Model III analysis shows that the designation of lead agency status affects the balance of power between agencies. Subordinating personnel and resources to another agency strips away the ability of the principal players to bargain for their interests. The principal players realize that the others cannot act autonomously. To maintain power, each agency has to ensure that its contributions to an operation do not jeopardize its interests. Withholding contributions to an operation or ensuring something in return, is then a means to protect its interests.

The inability of agency representatives to make decisions regarding agency tasks and expenditure of resources hinders operational level coordination. Without this decision-making authority, agency representatives can only fill liaison roles and share information. The ability of agencies to staff coordinating structures at the operational level is dependent upon whether the agency employee perceives the assignment as having a positive or negative impact on the employee's career. Unless the interagency community adopts a system of rewarding employees for gaining experience working outside the parent agency, such as the military's program of joint assignments, then interagency representatives will shun assignment to such organizations as JIACG. Changing how agencies view experience garnered through agency exchanges is a critical step toward making the interagency process functional.

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<sup>1</sup>The unified commands assigned geographic responsibilities are: US Joint Forces Command, US Central Command, US European Command, US Pacific Command, and US Southern Command. The Space, Special Operations, Strategic, Transportation, and Northern Commands are not bounded by geography.

<sup>2</sup>National Security Presidential Decision 1 (NSPD-1) dated 13 February 2001 outlines NSC organization during the Bush administration. It provides for six Policy Coordination Committees (PCCs) geographically focused for policy formulation and coordination into the following regions: Europe and Eurasia, Western Hemisphere, East Asia, South Asia, Near East and North Africa, and Africa.

<sup>3</sup>Department of State maintains six bureaus for managing diplomacy overseas: European and Eurasian, Western Hemisphere, East Asian and Pacific, Near Eastern, South Asian, and African.

<sup>4</sup>USAID maintains four regionally focused bureaus to manage missions overseas: Europe and Eurasia, Asia and Near East, Latin America and Caribbean, and Sub-Saharan Africa.

<sup>5</sup>Jennifer Morrison Taw, *Interagency Coordination in Operations Other Than War: Implications for the US Army* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1997), 17.

<sup>6</sup>Charles N. Cardinal, Timber P. Pangonas, and Edward Marks, “The Global War on Terrorism: A Regional Approach to Coordination,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* no. 32 (autumn 2002): 50.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., 50.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., 50.

<sup>9</sup>Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization; available from <http://www.state.gov/s/crs>; Internet; accessed on 28 January 2005.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid.

<sup>11</sup>Franks, 375.

<sup>12</sup>Bradley Graham, “US Officials Build A Powerful Partnership In Iraq,” *Washington Post*, 30 November 2004, 12.

<sup>13</sup> The exception is USAID which maintains a planning staff for long-term projects overseas.

<sup>14</sup>Taw, 11.

<sup>15</sup>Franks, 423.

<sup>16</sup>Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York, NY: Longman, 1999), 152.

<sup>17</sup>Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfelds’s reported penchant for questioning the status quo is well documented. In addition to various news accounts, author Bob

Woodward documents the impact of the Secretary of Defense on the military establishment in his works *Bush at War* and *Plan of Attack*.

<sup>18</sup>William W. Mendel and David G. Bradford, *Interagency Cooperation: A Regional Model for Peace Operations* (Washington, DC: NDU), 1995, 4-5.

<sup>19</sup>Edward Walsh, “Aid Groups Fear Civilian, Military Lines May Blur,” *Washington Post*, 3 April 2002, A14.

<sup>20</sup>Taw, 13.

<sup>21</sup>Department of State; available from <http://www.state.gov>; Internet; accessed on 28 January 2005.

<sup>22</sup>US Agency for International Development; available from <http://www.usaid.gov>; Internet; accessed on 28 January 2005.

<sup>23</sup>USAID organizes, funds, and maintains Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DARTs) for rapid deployment to provide humanitarian support to peoples in regions affected by natural and man made disasters.

<sup>24</sup> Due to its secretive nature, the CIA does not publish how it divides and staffs its regional operations.

<sup>25</sup>Budget of the United States Government Fiscal Year 2006; available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2006>; Internet; accessed on 5 February 2005.

<sup>26</sup>Allison, 167.

<sup>27</sup>Allison describes “Chiefs” as the head of the agency such as Secretary of Defense for DoD. The immediate staffs of each agency head are termed “Staffers.” The “Indians” are the political appointees and the permanent officials in each agency.

<sup>28</sup>Cardinal, 53.

<sup>29</sup>National Defense University and Joint Forces Command sponsored the study undertaken by ThoughtLink, Inc., a privately owned business that specializes in using collaborative technology to improve efficiency. The study was based on the interviews of 26 personnel from four USG agencies (DoS, DoD, DoJ, and DoT) associated with the JIACG concept. This study may be found at <http://www.thoughtlink.com/ppt/TLI-JIACGSurvey-FinalBrief-Revised.ppt>; Internet; accessed on 15 March 2005.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid.

<sup>33</sup>This perception was confirmed through conversations with a current DoS representative teaching at the US Army Command and General Staff College and a retired DoS US Ambassador in May 2005.

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMENDATIONS

#### Conclusions

The primary research question asked how are problems achieving unity of effort between military and nonmilitary organizations through the interagency process at the operational level impacted by organizational structure, operational framework, and organizational culture. The evidence found in the study of three operations posits that all three are contributing factors leading to a dysfunctional interagency process. The degree to which one factor contributes more than the others toward hindering unity of effort amongst agencies in the course of an operation is irrelevant. The evidence suggests that fixing one part of the equation will not significantly alter the end result thereby making the interagency process wholly functional. From this, it can be inferred that any viable remedy for fixing the interagency process will have to include measures that equally address all three factors.

The imbalance of representation at the operational level ensures that there will always be one agency that will be able to safeguard and promote its organizational interests at the expense of other agencies. This is reinforced in the process of designating a “lead agency” for operations, as in the case of DoD for Iraq’s reconstruction that empowers one agency with managerial oversight for all facets of the operation. This motivates smaller agencies, like DoS, to concentrate on pursuing their interests through bureaucratic bargaining and expenditure of capital at the strategic and tactical levels where the prospects for protecting its interests are greater. As such, the importance of

operational level planning and coordination is not shared amongst agencies but diminished to a point where it is an afterthought.

There is little rapidly deployable capacity outside DoD. A lack of resources that would provide for maintaining an expeditionary capability, plus differing views concerning operational objectives, further draws organizations away from active participation in the operational level interagency process. Graham Allison's models suggest that an organization will always choose to do what is best for the organization. If an organization's influence in the interagency process at the operational level, tied to its ability to leverage resources in turn for influence in the decision-making process, is small then there is no benefit for an agency to expend time and resources pursuing its interests at this level. This leads to a deliberate choice of not maintaining an operational capacity in nonmilitary agencies. This especially holds true if there is little chance that a particular agency based on its size and mission will be designated as the lead agency for an operation.

It is also not possible to achieve unity of effort if there is no doctrine to guide the interagency process. The absence of a framework with codified procedures for planning and coordination relegates any agreement emerging between agencies to be a product of bureaucratic bargaining. Without release of NSPD "XX" or similar document to replace PDD-56, any coordination done through the interagency process will be informal in nature. This predisposes the end result to be a matter of who has the most to gain and most to lose in the choice of policy or action to employ. Without an empowered oversight body designated by the NSC that can referee interagency coordination, the efficiency of the interagency process becomes dependant upon the actions of individual agencies and

their representatives who will approach each operation keeping in mind their parent organization's interests, motivations, and priorities.

Another missing component that is tied to a lack of doctrine is a common terminology shared amongst agencies. The complexity of operations (and even organizations such as DoD) demands that confusion not arise between agencies because each are describing what they will do and inadvertently, leading other organizations to believe something entirely different. Exposing interagency representatives to other organizations through exchange programs would do much to alleviate misunderstanding into how other organizations work. Although there is a POLAD on the combatant commander's staff, the POLAD does not carry the experience of working with the military back to other organizations following completion of his tour. Placing a former military officer at the head of a nonmilitary operation, such as General Garner taking the reigns of ORHA in Iraq, will not prevent mistrust and friction between agencies.

It is overly cynical to believe that organizations value achievement of their goals as paramount to the success of all US operations overseas. The importance of organizational culture on the interagency process, however, is significant. As Allison's models point out, organizations will behave in a manner that is fitting with their interests, stakes, motivations, and power. It is difficult to fathom an organization internally rewarding and promoting those representatives that criticize the organization's mission, parochial priorities, or patterns of behavior. This means that an organization's representatives will be reluctant to venture outside of what is expected in terms of keeping the organization's interests first and foremost when coordinating with other agencies. This suggests that although the arrival of JIACGs and S/CRS may theoretically

benefit the interagency process, both will likely be seen as being just another extension of DoD and DoS respectively which means they will be expected to look out for their parent agency's interests first.

It is possible that the interagency process at the operational level may become more functional over time. In all three operations used in this thesis, the rough start with regard to planning and coordination between agencies was eventually overcome to a degree through the application of individual agency flexibility. The interagency process and its importance to the implementation of US strategy abroad requires something to be done to make the process less dysfunctional and reactionary in nature. An externally mandated solution that addresses the impact of organizational structure, operational framework, and organizational culture on the process is the most viable path to making the interagency process functional.

### Recommendations

The increasing attention to interagency coordination brought on by experiences in operations such as Haiti, Afghanistan, and Iraq, to name a few, is encouraging. Formerly, most interagency process discussion centered on the process as it occurs at the strategic level. The recent creation of JIACGs and the ongoing process of creating the S/CRS point to acknowledgement amongst USG entities that coordination at the operational level is crucial to ensuring success in contingency operations. It is, of course, too early to assess whether these sub organizations will improve the interagency process and if so, how.

Congressional legislation is the most viable means toward solving the number of problems found in the interagency process. The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act is a model for such legislation. It demonstrates how to bring organizations which possess different

interests, capabilities, and strong cultural beliefs together so that future operations produce a synergism missing from previous operations. Similar legislation targeting the operational level could produce equal success if it mandates change to the various organizational structures; defines the operational framework wherein planning and coordination will take place; and influences organizational culture to embrace the interagency process.

The first step to strengthening the interagency process is to mandate that all USG entities regionally align operations so that one common picture of world events is produced. This will facilitate the next step of creating standing, regionally based interagency headquarters that will oversee all nonmilitary operations. To ensure that one agency does not have overwhelming influence over another, the lead of these headquarters should be determined through presidential appointment. These representatives will be linked to the strategic level by an interagency coordinator placed permanently on the NSC. This arrangement will allow for all regionally focused USG nonmilitary planning and coordination to be monitored at the operational level from a standing headquarters that receives guidance in the form of one voice from the strategic level.

Creating and promulgating interagency doctrine is crucial for strengthening the interagency process. This doctrine must include a common terminology to ensure agencies communicate clearly using the same operational concepts, task descriptions, and command arrangements. The doctrine must also, along with a standing pol-mil plan, define which agency will be in a supporting or supported role for a specific type of mission. This codified standard operating procedure will allow for future operations that

arise quickly, such as OEF, to proceed with a common understanding of what “should” happen based on existing arrangements and plans. These plans, encapsulated in pre-existing operation type specific pol-mil plans, would already have the support of the various agencies since each were part of the planning process.

To change the culture of agencies with regard to their view of the interagency process, the legislation must take a page from the Goldwater-Nichols Act and require experience working with other agencies as a prerequisite for promotion to lead their respective agency. Currently, there is no incentive for nonmilitary agency representatives to seek experience working with other agencies in coordinating bodies such as JIACGs or S/CRS. By linking potential for promotion with experience garnered through interagency assignment, similar to the military’s joint service officer requirement for flag rank, then these assignments will be sought out rather than shunned.

The creation of a standing, regionally based, deployable interagency headquarters empowered to orchestrate interagency coordination may have a greater impact on the process. If adequately empowered and supported from the strategic level, this entity may be able to provide that elusive unity of effort in the interagency process. Its emergence, however, is unlikely given the bureaucratic resistance it would face from the time the idea was promulgated. It may also only make interagency problems worsen by forcing agencies to further entrench to protect their interests.

Any future remedy to the “interagency problem” that would move it toward greater function and efficiency must equally address the influence of organizational structures, operational framework, and organizational culture on the process. Until this occurs, the interagency process at the operational level will continue to be fraught with

difficulties and the achievement of unity of effort amongst US agencies will be employed in future contingency operations will remain elusive.

## GLOSSARY

**Civil-Military Operations Center.** An ad hoc organization normally established within geographic combatant commands to assist in the coordination of military activities and other USG agencies. There is no established structure, and its size and composition is situation dependant.

**Combatant Commander.** A commander of one of the unified or specified commands established by the President.

**Country Team.** The senior, in country, US coordinating and supervising body that is headed by the Chief of the US diplomatic mission which is staffed by each represented agency as desired by the Chief of the diplomatic mission. The composition of the country team varies but may include a defense attaché, USAID representative, and a security element.

**Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART).** This is a rapidly deployable team under the US Agency for International Development (USAID) that provides humanitarian services in response to international disasters.

**Interagency Coordination.** The coordination that occurs between elements of DoD and engaged USG agencies for the purpose of accomplishing an objective.

**Lead agency.** A designation placed upon an agency to coordinate the interagency management of day-to-day conduct of an operation.

**Model I.** Views organizations as rational actors that are characterized by making value-maximizing and purposeful “acts” or “choices” based on the available options.

**Model II.** This model views organizational actions as outputs that emerge from decision-making processes that follow standard patterns of behavior. This model acknowledges parochial priorities, fractionated power, programs and repertoires, uncertainty avoidance, centralized coordination and control, administrative feasibility, and sequential attention to goals as factors that influence organizational decision-making.

**Model III.** This model considers organizational behavior as a matter of principal players maneuvering through a “zero-sum” game where perceptions, interests, stakes, motivations, positions, and power combine to influence decision-making. This model acknowledges that organizational leaders can not act autonomously and must rely on the give-and-take bargaining that defines bureaucratic politics.

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